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Deductibles and the Demand for Prescription Drugs: Evidence from French Data

Author

Listed:
  • Marc Perronnin

    (IRDES Institute for research and information in health economics)

  • Bidénam Kambia-Chopin

    (MSSS Ministère de la Santé et des services sociaux, Québec(Canada))

Abstract

On January 1st 2008, a 0.5€ deductible levied on every prescription drug package purchased was introduced in France. This study aims at shedding light on the effect of this policy on prescription drug purchasing behavior among the targeted individuals. Declared behavior from a cross-sectional study based on participants in the French Health, Health Care and Insurance Survey of 2008. The determinants of having changed one’s prescription drugs consumption following the introduction of deductibles were explored based on the socio-behavioral model of Andersen and an economic model of drug demand. The empirical analysis used a logistic regression. All other factors being equal, individuals’ probability of having modified their drug consumption behaviour following the introduction of deductibles decreases with income level and health status (self-assessed health and suffering from a chronic disease). Deductibles on prescription drugs represent a significant financial burden for low-income individuals and those in poor health, with the potential effect of limiting their access to drugs.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc Perronnin & Bidénam Kambia-Chopin, 2013. "Deductibles and the Demand for Prescription Drugs: Evidence from French Data," Working Papers DT54, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Feb 2013.
    • Handle: RePEc:irh:wpaper:dt54
    as

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    File URL: https://www.irdes.fr/EspaceAnglais/Publications/WorkingPapers/DT54DeductiblesAndDemandPrescriptionDrugs.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2013
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. O'Brien, Bernie, 1989. "The effect of patient charges on the utilisation of prescription medicines," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 109-132, March.
    2. Nyman, John A., 1999. "The economics of moral hazard revisited," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 811-824, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Perronnin, Marc, 2013. "Effet de l'assurance complémentaire santé sur les consommations médicales, entre risque moral et amélioration de l'accès aux soins," Economics Thesis from University Paris Dauphine, Paris Dauphine University, number 123456789/13659 edited by Wittwer, Jérôme.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private

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