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Hierarchical Organization and Performance Inequality: Evidence from Professional Cycling

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  • Bertrand Candelon
  • Arnaud Dupuy

Abstract

This paper proposes an equilibrium theory of the organization of work in an economy with an implicit market for productive time. In this market, agents buy or sell productive time. This implicit mar- ket gives rise to the formation of teams, organized in hierarchies with one leader (buyer) at the top and helpers (sellers) below. Relative to autarky, hierarchical organization leads to higher within and between team payo¤s/productivity inequality. This prediction is tested empir- ically in the context of professional road cycling. We show that the observed rise in performance inequality in the peloton since the 1970s is merely due to a rise in help intensity within team and consistent with a change in the hierarchical organization of teams.
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Suggested Citation

  • Bertrand Candelon & Arnaud Dupuy, 2014. "Hierarchical Organization and Performance Inequality: Evidence from Professional Cycling," Working Papers 2014-44, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
  • Handle: RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2014-44
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Arnaud Dupuy, 2015. "The Assignment of Workers to Tasks with Endogenous Supply of Skills," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 82(325), pages 24-45, January.
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    7. Edoardo Ciscato & Alfred Galichon & Marion Goussé, 2020. "Like Attract Like? A Structural Comparison of Homogamy across Same-Sex and Different-Sex Households," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(2), pages 740-781.
    8. Wladimir Andreff & Jean-François Mignot, 2022. "The Tour de France: A Success Story in Spite of Competitive Imbalance," Sports Economics, Management, and Policy, in: Daam Van Reeth (ed.), The Economics of Professional Road Cycling, edition 2, chapter 0, pages 163-180, Springer.
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    10. Candelon, Bertrand & Joëts, Marc & Mignon, Valérie, 2024. "What makes econometric ideas popular: The role of connectivity," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 53(7).
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    13. Sebastian Bervoets & Bruno Decreuse & Mathieu Faure, 2014. "A Renewed Analysis of Cheating in Contests: Theory and Evidence from Recovery Doping," AMSE Working Papers 1441, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised Jun 2015.
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    17. Edoardo Ciscato & Alfred Galichon & Marion Goussé, 2020. "Like Attract Like? A Structural Comparison of Homogamy across Same-Sex and Different-Sex Households," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(2), pages 740-781.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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