Redistributive Taxation, Incentives, and the Intertemporal Evolution of Human Capital
This paper contributes to the literature on redistributive taxation and human capital dynamics by explicitly analyzing the role of incentives in the education market where human capital is produced. We introduce an explicit education market with heterogeneous private schools in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations and human capital accumulation. We use the model to simulate the effects of taxation on growth, intergenerational mobility, inequality, and welfare. Equalization in education expenditures reduces incentives for differentiation in the education market, with the distribution of education investments shifting towards the least productive schools. This has significant consequences on equilibrium outcomes, and highlights the importance of incorporating the role of intermediation when analyzing redistribution policies.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (562) 354-4303
Fax: (562) 553-1664
Web page: http://www.economia.puc.cl
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Miguel Urquiola & Eric Verhoogen, 2009.
"Class-Size Caps, Sorting, and the Regression-Discontinuity Design,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 179-215, March.
- Urquiola, Miguel & Verhoogen, Eric, 2007. "Class Size and Sorting in Market Equilibrium: Theory and Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 2963, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Urquiola, Miguel & Verhoogen, Eric A, 2007. "Class Size and Sorting in Market Equilibrium: Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 6425, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Miguel Urquiola & Eric Verhoogen, 2007. "Class Size and Sorting in Market Equilibrium: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 13303, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bernardita Vial, 2008. "Competitive Equilibrium and Reputation under Imperfect Public Monitoring," Documentos de Trabajo 327, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- José De Gregorio & Se-Jik Kim, 1998.
"Credit Markets with Differences in Abilities: Education, Distribution, and Growth,"
Documentos de Trabajo
42, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- De Gregorio, Jose & Kim, Se-Jik, 2000. "Credit Markets with Differences in Abilities: Education, Distribution, and Growth," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(3), pages 579-607, August.
- Jose De Gregorio & Se-Jik Kim, 1994. "Credit Markets with Differences in Abilities; Education, Distribution, and Growth," IMF Working Papers 94/47, International Monetary Fund.
- MacLeod, Bentley, 2009.
"Anti-Lemons: School Reputation and Educational Quality,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt3rc708kd, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- W. Bentley MacLeod & Miguel Urquiola, 2009. "Anti-Lemons: School Reputation and Educational Quality," NBER Working Papers 15112, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Miguel Urquiola, 2005. "Does School Choice Lead to Sorting? Evidence from Tiebout Variation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1310-1326, September.
- Luís Francisco Aguiar-Conraria, 2004.
"Public vs Private Schooling in an Endogenous Growth Model,"
NIPE Working Papers
7/2004, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
- Luís Aguiar-Conraria, 2005. "Public vs private schooling in an endogenous growth model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 9(10), pages 1-6.
- Buly A Cardak, 2004.
"Education Vouchers, Growth and Income Inequality,"
2004.03, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
- Thomas J. Nechyba, 2000. "Mobility, Targeting, and Private-School Vouchers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 130-146, March.
- James Heckman & Pedro Carneiro & Flavio Cunha, 2004.
"The Technology of Skill Formation,"
2004 Meeting Papers
681, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Gianni de Fraja, 2002.
"The Design of Optimal Education Policies,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 437-466.
- Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard E, 1998. "Competition between Private and Public Schools, Vouchers, and Peer-Group Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 33-62, March.
- Dennis Epple & Richard Romano, 2008.
"Educational Vouchers And Cream Skimming,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1395-1435, November.
- Bohacek, Radim & Kapicka, Marek, 2008.
"Optimal human capital policies,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16, January.
- Loury, Glenn C, 1981. "Intergenerational Transfers and the Distribution of Earnings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 843-67, June.
- Kaganovich, M & Zilcha, I, 1997.
"Education, Social Security and Growth,"
1-97, Tel Aviv.
- Minoru Watanabe & Masaya Yasuoka, 2009. "Income growth, inequality and preference for education investment: a note," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(4), pages 3075-3082.
- Glomm, Gerhard & Ravikumar, B, 1992. "Public versus Private Investment in Human Capital Endogenous Growth and Income Inequality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 818-34, August.
- Matías Tapia, 2010. "Competition, Incentives, and the Distribution of Investments in Private School Markets," Documentos de Trabajo 387, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ioe:doctra:390. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jaime Casassus)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.