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Revenue non-equivalence in multidimensional procurement auctions under asymmetry

Author

Listed:
  • Shivangi Chandel

    () (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research)

  • Shubhro Sarkar

    () (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research)

Abstract

Using an example we show that the Revenue Equivalence in the Scoring Auctions, as postulated by Che (1993), no longer holds when the suppliers are asymmetric in their costs of production.

Suggested Citation

  • Shivangi Chandel & Shubhro Sarkar, 2014. "Revenue non-equivalence in multidimensional procurement auctions under asymmetry," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2014-008, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
  • Handle: RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2014-008
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    File URL: http://www.igidr.ac.in/pdf/publication/WP-2014-008.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yeon-Koo Che, 1993. "Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 668-680, Winter.
    2. John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2004. "Equilibrium in Scoring Auctions," Working Papers 2004.148, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. Lengwiler, Yvan & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2006. "Corruption in Procurement Auctions," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 90, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    4. Bharat Ramaswami & Pratap Singh Birthal & P.K. Joshi, 2009. "Grower heterogeneity and the gains from contract farming: The case of Indian poultry," Indian Growth and Development Review, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 2(1), pages 56-74, April.
    5. Fernando Branco, 1997. "The Design of Multidimensional Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 63-81, Spring.
    6. Rene Kirkegaard, 2011. "Ranking Asymmetric Auctions using the Dispersive Order," Working Papers 1101, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    7. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    8. Werner Güth & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Sabine Kröger, 2006. "Procurement Experiments With Unknown Costs Of Quality," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(2), pages 133-148, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Public Procurement; Asymmetric Bidders; Multidimensional Bids;

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

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