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Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power

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  • Mr. Eric Le Borgne
  • Mr. Gauti B. Eggertsson

Abstract

This paper proposes a theory to explain why a politician delegates policy tasks to a technocrat in an independent institution. It formalizes the rationales for delegation highlighted by Hamilton (1788) and by Blinder (1998). Delegation trades-off the cost of having a possibly incompetent technocrat with a long-term job contract against the benefit of having a technocrat who (i) invests more effort into the specialized policy task and (ii) is better insulated from the whims of public opinion. One natural application of the theory is in the field of monetary policy where the model provides a new theory of central bank independence.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. Eric Le Borgne & Mr. Gauti B. Eggertsson, 2007. "Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power," IMF Working Papers 2007/091, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2007/091
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    9. Mr. Ben Lockwood & Mr. Eric Le Borgne, 2003. "Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Experimentation vs. Career Concerns," IMF Working Papers 2003/057, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Mr. Gauti B. Eggertsson, 2003. "How to Fight Deflation in a Liquidity Trap: Committing to Being Irresponsible," IMF Working Papers 2003/064, International Monetary Fund.
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    Cited by:

    1. Vidal, Jordi Blanes I & Leaver, Clare, 2008. "Pandering judges," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 58174, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Artur Grigoryan, 2011. "Incentives and the delegation of decision making power in sovereign wealth funds," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 146-11, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
    3. Artur Grigoryan, 2015. "Delegation in sovereign wealth funds," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 62(4), pages 363-380, December.
    4. Jordi Blanes i Vidal & Clare Leaver, 2008. "Pandering Judges," STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series 002, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    5. Margaret Stevens & Jordi Blanes i Vidal, 2008. "Pandering Judges," Economics Series Working Papers 390, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    6. Artur Grigoryan, 2011. "Incentives and the Delegation of Decision Making Power in Sovereign Wealth Funds," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201117, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).

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