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Incentives and the delegation of decision making power in sovereign wealth funds

  • Artur Grigoryan

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    The paper models the incentives of a politician to delegate the decision making power in a sovereign wealth fund to an independent external manager. It formalizes the learning-effects as well as the increase of transparency of the SWF and the rise of investment possibilities associated with higher transparency. It also focuses on the role of elections as a basic mechanism to control and discipline politicians. I show that the politician has incentives for strategic behaviour if voters have incomplete information about his competence. The paper also studies when the delegation of decision making power is socially optimal and under which circumstances it takes place.

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    File URL: http://www.wiwi.uni-siegen.de/vwl/repec/sie/papers/146-11.pdf
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    Paper provided by Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht in its series Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge with number 146-11.

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    Length: 30 pages
    Date of creation: 2011
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:sie:siegen:146-11
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Hölderlinstr. 3, D - 57068 Siegen
    Phone: ++49 (0)271 740-3139
    Fax: ++49 (0)271 740-2590
    Web page: http://www.uni-siegen.de/fb5/vwl/research/diskussionsbeitraege/
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    1. Eric Le Borgne & Gauti B. Eggertsson, 2007. "Dynamic Incentives and the Optimal Delegation of Political Power," IMF Working Papers 07/91, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Edwin M. Truman, 2008. "A Blueprint for Sovereign Wealth Fund Best Practices," Policy Briefs PB08-3, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    3. William L. Megginson & Bernardo Bortolotti & Veljko Fotak & William Miracky, 2009. "Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment Patterns and Performance," Working Papers 2009.22, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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