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Mediación multilateral de la ayuda extranjera

  • Matteo Bobba
  • Andrew Powell

Porqué los donantes bilaterales intermedian la ayuda a través de una multilateral y no directamente? Este paper sugiere un trade-off: múltiples donantes bilaterales para cada beneficiario puede implicar problemas estratégicos y de coordinación pero mediación a través de una multilateral puede atenuar los objetivos del donante. Este trabajo maneja un panel tradicional y regresiones bilaterales con un bilateral-par, efectos fijos para modelar las decisiones de asignación de ayuda. Los resultados confirman que la política es importante para los donantes bilaterales pero también la fragmentación de la ayuda y el comportamiento estratégico afecta la asignación de ayuda. Las multilaterals solucionan problemas estratégicos y de coordinación entre los donantes y, mientras la política juega un rol significante, hay evidencia de un atenuante de este efecto

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Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 4501.

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Date of creation: Dec 2006
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Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4501
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  1. Raghuram G. Rajan & Arvind Subramanian, 2005. "Aid and Growth: What Does the Cross-Country Evidence Really Show?," NBER Working Papers 11513, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  7. Birdsall, Nancy & Claessens, Stijn & Diwan, Ishac, 2002. "Will HIPC Matter? The Debt Game and Donor Behaviour in Africa," Working Paper Series UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  8. Gilbert, Christopher & Powell, Andrew & Vines, David, 1999. "Positioning the World Bank," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(459), pages F598-633, November.
  9. David Roodman, 2006. "Competitive Proliferation of Aid Projects: A Model," Working Papers 89, Center for Global Development.
  10. Alberto Chong & Mark Gradstein, 2006. "Who's Afraid of Foreign Aid? The Donors' Perspective," Research Department Publications 4452, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  11. Raul Hopkins & Andrew Powell & Amlan Roy & Christopher L. Gilbert, 1997. "The World Bank And Conditionality," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(4), pages 507-516.
  12. Mark Gradstein & Alberto E. Chong, 2006. "Who's Afraid of Foreign Aid?: The Donors' Perspective," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6706, Inter-American Development Bank.
  13. Riccardo Faini & Enzo Grilli, 2004. "Who runs the IFIs?," Development Working Papers 191, Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano.
  14. Trumbull, William N & Wall, Howard J, 1994. "Estimating Aid-Allocation Criteria with Panel Data," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(425), pages 876-82, July.
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