Learning in economics: the Austrian insights
In this contribution I first present a selective review of the literature on learning theories in economics. I then show that those theories are often assimilating knowledge to information or considering knowledge as a structure of information. Finally I discuss the possibility for those theories to be defined as Austrian and I conclude with a presentation of a research agenda.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2001|
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- Giovanni Dosi & Luigi Marengo & Giorgio Fagiolo, 2003.
"Learning in Evolutionary Environments,"
LEM Papers Series
2003/20, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
- Richard Langlois & Pierre Garrouste, 1996.
"Cognition, Redundancy, and Learning in Organizations,"
1996-10, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Richard Langlois & Pierre Garrouste, 1997. "Cognition, Redundancy, And Learning In Organizations," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(4), pages 287-300.
- Bernard Walliser, 1998. "A spectrum of equilibration processes in game theory," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 67-87.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998.
"Learning in Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2222, David K. Levine.
- H. Peyton Young, 1996. "The Economics of Convention," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 105-122, Spring.
- Matthew Rabin., 1991.
"Cognitive Dissonance and Social Change,"
Economics Working Papers
91-180, University of California at Berkeley.
- Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-81, September.
- Philippe DULBECCO & GARROUSTE, 1998.
"Towards an Austrian Theory of the Firm,"
- Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
- John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June.
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