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Anti-Competitive Agreements in Russian Courts (2008 - 2012): Antitrust Law Implementation and Interpetation

Author

Listed:
  • Andrey V. Makarov

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

This paper analyses antitrust enforcement practice in Russia (2008–2012), in the area of competition-restricting agreements (horizontal and vertical). The analysis is based on a court decision database of litigation with the Russian competition authority (FAS). The database contains 400 cases, including 236 horizontal agreements (HA), 164 other agreements (vertical agreements (VA), conglomerate and mixed agreements). On the basis of this database important features of the interpretation and implementation of the competition law in Russian practice and the priority areas of the enforcement were identified. Antitrust policy was analysed taking into account the risks of type 1 and 2 errors, including the problem of the flexibility of prohibitions (per se vs rule of reason (ROR)), standards of proof, the problem of consistency of enforcement

Suggested Citation

  • Andrey V. Makarov, 2016. "Anti-Competitive Agreements in Russian Courts (2008 - 2012): Antitrust Law Implementation and Interpetation," HSE Working papers WP BRP 67/LAW/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:67/law/2016
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pittman, R., 1997. "Competition Law in Central Eastern Europe: Five Years Later," Papers 97-2, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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