Leniency program and cartel deterrence in Russia: effects assessment
The empirical assessment of leniency program (LP) in Russia shows the effects of changes in the rules on the behavior of market participants. In this paper we test hypotheses about LP enforcement against the characteristics of cartels: their subject, duration and the number of participants. We show that LP in Russia makes enforcement of the behavior of market participants less effective and accordingly reduces cartel discoveries. However the reforms of Program in 2009 give some positive results
|Date of creation:||2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in WP BRP Series: Public Administration / PA, November 2013, pages 1-22|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Myasnitskaya 20, Moscow 101000|
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- Marvao, Catarina, 2014. "The EU Leniency Programme and Recidivism," SITE Working Paper Series 27, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, Stockholm School of Economics.
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