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Abuse of collective dominance under the competition law of the Russian Federation

  • Avdasheva, Svetlana
  • Goreyko, Nadezhda
  • Pittman, Russell

In 2006, Russia amended its competition law and added the concepts of “collective dominance” and its abuse. This was seen as an attempt to address the common problem of “conscious parallelism” among firms in concentrated industries. Critics feared that the enforcement of this provision would become tantamount to government regulation of prices. In this paper we examine the enforcement experience to date, looking especially closely at sanctions imposed on firms in the oil industry. Some difficulties and complications experienced in enforcement are analyzed, and some alternative strategies for addressing anticompetitive behavior in concentrated industries discussed.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 33742.

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Date of creation: 22 Sep 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:33742
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  1. Guido Friebel & Sergei Guriev & Russell Pittman & Elizaveta Shevyakhova & Anna Tomov�, 2006. "Railroad Restructuring in Russia and Central and Eastern Europe: One Solution for All Problems?," Transport Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(3), pages 251-271, August.
  2. Anita Banicevic & Mark Katz, 2009. "Collective Dominance In Canada: A New Direction," Antitrust Chronicle, Competition Policy International, vol. 11.
  3. Broadman, Harry G., 2000. "Reducing structural dominance and entry barriers in Russian industry," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2330, The World Bank.
  4. S. Avdasheva & A. Shastitko, 2004. "Industrial Policy and Competition Policy: Problems of Interaction and Lessons for Russia," Problems of Economic Transition, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 47(6), pages 48-65, October.
  5. Lia Vitzilaiou & Constantinos Lambadarios, 2009. "The Slippery Slope of Addressing Collective Dominance Under Article 82 EC," Antitrust Chronicle, Competition Policy International, vol. 10.
  6. Billard, Olivier & Ivaldi, Marc & Mitraille, Sebastien, 2011. "Evaluation of the Risks of Collective Dominance in the Audit Industry in France," CEPR Discussion Papers 8417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Andrey Shastitko, 2011. "Collective Dominance Through the Lens of Comparative Antitrust," Antitrust Chronicle, Competition Policy International, vol. 8.
  8. Harry Broadman, 2000. "Reducing Structural Dominance and Entry Barriers in Russian Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 155-175, September.
  9. Richard Schmalensee, 1978. "Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 305-327, Autumn.
  10. Pittman, Russell, 2007. "Restructuring the Russian electricity sector: Re-creating California?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 1872-1883, March.
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