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Abuse of collective dominance under the competition law of the Russian Federation

Author

Listed:
  • Avdasheva, Svetlana
  • Goreyko, Nadezhda
  • Pittman, Russell

Abstract

In 2006, Russia amended its competition law and added the concepts of “collective dominance” and its abuse. This was seen as an attempt to address the common problem of “conscious parallelism” among firms in concentrated industries. Critics feared that the enforcement of this provision would become tantamount to government regulation of prices. In this paper we examine the enforcement experience to date, looking especially closely at sanctions imposed on firms in the oil industry. Some difficulties and complications experienced in enforcement are analyzed, and some alternative strategies for addressing anticompetitive behavior in concentrated industries discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Avdasheva, Svetlana & Goreyko, Nadezhda & Pittman, Russell, 2011. "Abuse of collective dominance under the competition law of the Russian Federation," MPRA Paper 33742, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:33742
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33742/1/MPRA_paper_33742.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrey Shastitko, 2011. "Collective Dominance Through the Lens of Comparative Antitrust," Antitrust Chronicle, Competition Policy International, vol. 8.
    2. Guido Friebel & Sergei Guriev & Russell Pittman & Elizaveta Shevyakhova & Anna Tomová, 2006. "Railroad Restructuring in Russia and Central and Eastern Europe: One Solution for All Problems?," Transport Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(3), pages 251-271, August.
    3. Richard Schmalensee, 1978. "Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 305-327, Autumn.
    4. Pittman, Russell, 2007. "Restructuring the Russian electricity sector: Re-creating California?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 1872-1883, March.
    5. Broadman, Harry G., 2000. "Reducing structural dominance and entry barriers in Russian industry," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2330, The World Bank.
    6. Anita Banicevic & Mark Katz, 2009. "Collective Dominance In Canada: A New Direction," Antitrust Chronicle, Competition Policy International, vol. 11.
    7. Billard, Olivier & Ivaldi, Marc & Mitraille, Sébastien, 2011. "Evaluation of the Risks of Collective Dominance in the Audit Industry in France," IDEI Working Papers 674, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 07 Jun 2012.
    8. S. Avdasheva & A. Shastitko, 2004. "Industrial Policy and Competition Policy: Problems of Interaction and Lessons for Russia," Problems of Economic Transition, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(6), pages 48-65.
    9. Lia Vitzilaiou & Constantinos Lambadarios, 2009. "The Slippery Slope of Addressing Collective Dominance Under Article 82 EC," Antitrust Chronicle, Competition Policy International, vol. 10.
    10. Harry Broadman, 2000. "Reducing Structural Dominance and Entry Barriers in Russian Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 17(2), pages 155-175, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    competition law; collective dominance; abuse of dominance; Russian Federation;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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