IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Sitting on the fence: does having a ‘dual-director’ add to bank profitability?

  • Polina Savchenko

    ()

    (Center for Institutional Studies, National Research University ‘Higher School of Economics’, Moscow, Russia)

  • Maria Semenova

    ()

    (Associate Professor, Center for Institutional Studies, National Research University ‘Higher School of Economics’, Moscow, Russia)

This paper investigates how combining positions between the board of directors and top-management affects bank profitability. We use 2010 bank-level data from 112 countries. Our results suggest that combining positions reduces both ROE and ROA of banks. However, for banks in developing countries, the influence proves to be positive. We also show that the higher the proportion of the board members who simultaneously hold a managerial position, the lower the profitability of the bank. This effect is observed both for developed and developing countries

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.hse.ru/data/2013/08/14/1291400423/16FE2013.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by National Research University Higher School of Economics in its series HSE Working papers with number WP BRP 16/FE/2013.

as
in new window

Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in WP BRP Series: Financial Economics / FE, August 2013, pages 1-23
Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:16/fe/2013
Contact details of provider: Postal: Myasnitskaya 20, Moscow 101000
Phone: +7(495)7713232
Fax: +7(495)6287931
Web page: http://www.hse.ru/Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Eralp Bektas & Turhan Kaymak, 2009. "Governance Mechanisms and Ownership in an Emerging Market: The Case of Turkish Banks," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 45(6), pages 20-32, November.
  2. Brickley, James A. & Coles, Jeffrey L. & Jarrell, Gregg, 1997. "Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 189-220, June.
  3. Savchenko, P. & Semenova, M., 2013. "Sitting on the Fence: Does Having a "Dual-Director" Add to Bank Profitability?," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 12-32.
  4. Berger, Allen N. & Kick, Thomas & Schaeck, Klaus, 2012. "Executive board composition and bank risk taking," Discussion Papers 03/2012, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
  5. Pi, Lynn & Timme, Stephen G., 1993. "Corporate control and bank efficiency," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2-3), pages 515-530, April.
  6. Claessens, Stijn & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, 2013. "Corporate governance in emerging markets: A survey," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 1-33.
  7. Webb Cooper, Elizabeth, 2009. "Monitoring and governance of private banks," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 253-264, May.
  8. Mohamed Belkhir, 2009. "Board structure, ownership structure and firm performance: evidence from banking," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(19), pages 1581-1593.
  9. Yeh, Yin-Hua & Woidtke, Tracie, 2005. "Commitment or entrenchment?: Controlling shareholders and board composition," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(7), pages 1857-1885, July.
  10. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
  11. John Griffith & Lawrence Fogelberg & H. Weeks, 2002. "CEO ownership, corporate control, and bank performance," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 170-183, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:16/fe/2013. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamil Abdulaev)

or (Victoria Elkina)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.