A Model of Union Formation
In an analysis of the formation of unions within a single firm, this paper addresses conditions under which encompassing unions form. It is shown that a production function satisfying decreasing marginal productivity leads to the formation of encompassing unions. This result holds for different ways of dividing the surplus within the union. The effects of changes in heterogeneity, e.g. increased demand for skilled labor, are also analyzed. In the most reasonable setup, a change in heterogeneity does not affect the decision whether to form a union or not. This contrasts with the result in Jun (1989).
|Date of creation:||03 Jun 1999|
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- Barry T. Hirsch, 1982. "The Interindustry Structure of Unionism, Earnings, and Earnings Dispersion," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 36(1), pages 22-39, October.
- Horn, Henrik & Wolinsky, Asher, 1988. "Worker Substitutability and Patterns of Unionisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 484-497, June.
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- Richard Freeman & Jeffrey Pelletier, 1990.
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British Journal of Industrial Relations,
London School of Economics, vol. 28(2), pages 141-164, 07.
- Richard Freeman & Jeffrey Pelletier, 1989. "The Impact of Industrial Relations Legislation on British Union Density," NBER Working Papers 3167, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, September.
- Blau, Francine D & Kahn, Lawrence M, 1996. "International Differences in Male Wage Inequality: Institutions versus Market Forces," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(4), pages 791-836, August.
- Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, 1994. "International Differences in Male Wage Inequality: Institutions versus Market Forces," NBER Working Papers 4678, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
- Byoung Heon Jun, 1989. "Non-cooperative Bargaining and Union Formation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(1), pages 59-76.
- Nickell, Stephen & Bell, Brian, 1995. "The Collapse in Demand for the Unskilled and Unemployment across the OECD," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 11(1), pages 40-62, Spring. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)