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Optimal Paternalism: Sin Taxes and Health Subsidies

Author

Listed:
  • Aronsson, Thomas

    (Department of Economics, Umeå University)

  • Thunström, Linda

    (Department of Economics, Umeå University)

Abstract

The starting point for this paper is the potential self-control problem underlying the consumption of unhealthy food. The purpose is to analyze public policies, which are designed to correct for the welfare loss associated with such behavior. Contrary to previous studies, our analysis suggests that subsidies on wealth and health capital are part of the policy package, which can be used to implement a socially optimal resource allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • Aronsson, Thomas & Thunström, Linda, 2005. "Optimal Paternalism: Sin Taxes and Health Subsidies," Umeå Economic Studies 662, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:umnees:0662
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    2. Jonathan Gruber & Botond Köszegi, 2001. "Is Addiction "Rational"? Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(4), pages 1261-1303.
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    5. Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 2003. "Studying Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a Model of Sin Taxes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 186-191, May.
    6. David Laibson, 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 443-478.
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    8. Fischer, Carolyn, 1999. "Read This Paper Even Later: Procrastination with Time-Inconsistent Preferences," RFF Working Paper Series dp-99-20, Resources for the Future.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Smed, Sinne & Jensen, Jorgen D. & Denver, Sigrid, 2007. "Socio-economic characteristics and the effect of taxation as a health policy instrument," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(5-6), pages 624-639.
    2. Dogbe, W. & Gil, J.M., 2018. "Effects of a modified Danish fat tax on food consumption and nutrients intake in Spain," 2018 Conference, July 28-August 2, 2018, Vancouver, British Columbia 277237, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    3. Kaisa Kotakorpi, 2009. "Paternalism and Tax Competition," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 111(1), pages 125-149, March.
    4. Işıl Fulya ORKUNOĞLU-ŞAHİN & Ahmet Burçin YERELİ, 2018. "Mükelleflerin Vergiye Direnme Yöntemleri ve Türkiye’de Günah Vergilerindeki Artışların Değerlendirilmesi," Sosyoekonomi Journal, Sosyoekonomi Society, issue 26(35).
    5. Jukka Pirttilä & Sanna Tenhunen, 2008. "Pawns and queens revisited: public provision of private goods when individuals make mistakes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(5), pages 599-619, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Health; Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting; Taxes; Subsidies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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