Democracy as a Middle Ground: A Uni…ed Theory of Development and Political Regimes
A large literature documents that autocratic regimes have not, on average, outperformed democratic regimes, although they do display greater variance in economic performance. At the same time, no long-lived autocracy currently is rich whereas every long-lived democracy is. This paper puts forth a theory to account for these observations. The theory rests on the idea that autocratic leaders are heterogenous in their preferences and the idea that special interest groups can successfully lobby a democratic regime for policies that delay industrialization. We show that an elite landed class chooses to democratize society only after the economy has accumulated enough wealth.
|Date of creation:||27 May 2010|
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- Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Arvind Subramanian, 2013.
"Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria,"
Journal of African Economies,
Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 22(4), pages 570-615, August.
- Arvind Subramanian & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2003. "Addressing the Natural Resource Curse; An Illustration From Nigeria," IMF Working Papers 03/139, .
- Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Arvind Subramanian, 2003. "Addressing the Natural Resource Curse: An Illustration from Nigeria," NBER Working Papers 9804, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Xavier Sala-i-Martín & Arvind Subramanian, 2003. "Addressing the natural resource curse: An illustration from Nigeria," Economics Working Papers 685, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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