Large-Country Effects in International Emissions Trading: A Laboratoty Test
The Experiment mimics carbon emissions trade among twelve industrialized countries during the end of a five-year-long trading period when traders are likely to have nearly full information about the underlying net demand. Trade is assumed to be governed by so-called double-auction rules. The hypotheses are i) and ii) that larger countries would not be able to influence price levels to their advantage. The findings support the first hypothesis but are inconclusive regarding the second. although they illustrate that large country may not be able to sustain favorable prices.
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|Date of creation:||03 Oct 1999|
|Publication status:||Published in The Energy Journal, 2003, pages 1-26.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Department of Economics, Stockholm, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden|
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Ledyard, John O. & Szakaly-Moore, Kristin, 1994.
"Designing organizations for trading pollution rights,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 167-196, October.
- Ledyard, John O. & Szakaly, Kristin E., "undated". "Designing Organizations for Trading Pollution Rights," Working Papers 838, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- John Ledyard & Kristin Szakaly-Moore, 1993. "Designing Organizations for Trading Pollution Rights," Experimental 9307001, EconWPA, revised 28 Jul 1993.
- Hizen, Y. & Saijo, T., 2000. "Designing GHG Emissions Trading Institutions in the Kyoto Protocol: an Experimental Approach," ISER Discussion Paper 0492, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Bohm, Peter & Carlen, Bjorn, 1999. "Emission quota trade among the few: laboratory evidence of joint implementation among committed countries," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 43-66, January.
- Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "A simple testable model of double auction markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 47-70, January.
- R. Andrew Muller & Stuart Mestelman & John Spraggon & Rob Godby, 1999. "Can auctions control market power in emissions trading markets," Department of Economics Working Papers 1999-12, McMaster University.
- Smith, Vernon L. & Williams, Arlington W., 1982. "The effects of rent asymmetries in experimental auction markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 99-116, March.
- Gjerstad, Steven & Dickhaut, John, 1998. "Price Formation in Double Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-29, January.
- Gjerstad, S. & Dickhaut, J., 1995. "Price Formation in Double Auctions," Papers 284, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
- Steven Gjerstad & John Dickhaut, 2003. "Price Formation in Double Auctions," Microeconomics 0302001, EconWPA.
- Robert W. Hahn, 1984. "Market Power and Transferable Property Rights," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 99(4), pages 753-765.
- Easley, David & Ledyard, John., "undated". "Theories of Price Formation and Exchange in Double Oral Auctions," Working Papers 611, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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