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Price formation in double auction markets

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  • Cason, Timothy N.
  • Friedman, Daniel

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  • Cason, Timothy N. & Friedman, Daniel, 1996. "Price formation in double auction markets," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 20(8), pages 1307-1337, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:20:y:1996:i:8:p:1307-1337
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-955, December.
    2. Vernon L. Smith, 1962. "An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 322-322.
    3. Gjerstad, Steven & Dickhaut, John, 1998. "Price Formation in Double Auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-29, January.
    4. Van Boening, Mark V & Wilcox, Nathaniel T, 1996. "Avoidable Cost: Ride a Double Auction Roller Coaster," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 461-477, June.
    5. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "A simple testable model of double auction markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 47-70, January.
    6. Friedman, Daniel, 1984. "On the Efficiency of Experimental Double Auction Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(1), pages 60-72, March.
    7. Friedman, Daniel, 1993. "How Trading Institutions Affect Financial Market Performance: Some Laboratory Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(3), pages 410-435, July.
    8. Friedman, Daniel & Ostroy, Joseph, 1995. "Competitivity in Auction Markets: An Experimental and Theoretical Investigation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 22-53, January.
    9. Robert B. Wilson, 1987. "On Equilibria of Bid-Ask Markets," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: George R. Feiwel (ed.), Arrow and the Ascent of Modern Economic Theory, chapter 11, pages 375-414, Palgrave Macmillan.
    10. Smith, Vernon L. & Williams, Arlington W., 1982. "The effects of rent asymmetries in experimental auction markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 99-116, March.
    11. Gode, Dhananjay K & Sunder, Shyam, 1993. "Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 119-137, February.
    12. Williams, Arlington W & Smith, Vernon L, 1984. "Cyclical Double-Auction Markets with and without Speculators," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(1), pages 1-33, January.
    13. Fama, Eugene F, 1970. "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 25(2), pages 383-417, May.
    14. Jon Ketcham & Vernon L. Smith & Arlington W. Williams, 1984. "A Comparison of Posted-Offer and Double-Auction Pricing Institutions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(4), pages 595-614.
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