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Competitivity in Auction Markets: An Experimental and Theoretical Investigation

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  • Friedman, Daniel
  • Ostroy, Joseph

Abstract

The authors report successive rounds of theory and laboratory experiments investigating price-taking behavior and market efficiency. They focus on the impact of structural parameters as well as trading institution. The structural parameters involve noncompetitive supply and demand, and a new odd-lot trading procedure for divisible goods. The trading institutions include the continuous double auction and the one-shot clearinghouse as well as a new quantities-only clearinghouse institution. The authors present and justify an as-if complete information theory that explains the competitive outcomes and that correctly predicts highly noncompetitive outcomes in quantities-only clearinghouse markets. Copyright 1995 by Royal Economic Society.

Suggested Citation

  • Friedman, Daniel & Ostroy, Joseph, 1995. "Competitivity in Auction Markets: An Experimental and Theoretical Investigation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 22-53, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:105:y:1995:i:428:p:22-53
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