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One Share-One Vote: New Empirical Evidence


  • Eklund, Johan E.

    () (The Ratio Institute and Jönköping International Business School)

  • Poulsen, Thomas

    () (Copenhagen Business School)


Shares with more voting rights than cash flow rights provide their owners with a disproportional influence that is often found to destroy the value of outside equity. This is taken as evidence of discretionary use of power. However, concentration of power does not necessarily result from control enhancing mechanisms; it could also be that some shareholders retain a large block in a one share-one vote structure. In this paper, we develop a methodology to disentangle disproportionality, which allows us to test the effect of deviations from one share-one vote more precisely. Our empirical findings add to the existing literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Eklund, Johan E. & Poulsen, Thomas, 2010. "One Share-One Vote: New Empirical Evidence," Ratio Working Papers 162, The Ratio Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0162

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item


    Ownership structure; one share-one vote; proportionality; performance; entrenchment;

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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