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One Share-One Vote: New Empirical Evidence


  • Eklund , Johan

    (Jönköping International Business School and Ratio Institute)

  • Poulsen, Thomas

    (Copenhagen Business School)


Shares with more voting rights than cash flow rights provide their owners with a disproportional influence that is often found to destroy the value of outside equity. This is taken as evidence of discretionary use of power. However, concentration of power does not necessarily result from control enhancing mechanisms; it could also be that some shareholders retain a large block in a one share-one vote structure. In this paper, we develop a methodology to disentangle disproportionality, which allows us to test the effect of deviations from one share-one vote more precisely. Our empirical findings add to the existing literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Eklund , Johan & Poulsen, Thomas, 2010. "One Share-One Vote: New Empirical Evidence," Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation 238, Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0238

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    1. Felipe Larraín & José Tavares, 2004. "Does Foreign Direct Investment Decrease Corruption?," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 41(123), pages 217-230.
    2. Felipa De Mello-Sampayo, 2007. "The Location of the United States' FDI Under the Share Gravity Model," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(4), pages 491-519.
    3. J. M. C. Santos Silva & Silvana Tenreyro, 2006. "The Log of Gravity," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 88(4), pages 641-658, November.
    4. Dahlström, Tobias & Johnson, Andreas, 2007. "Bureaucratic Corruption, MNEs and FDI," Working Paper Series in Economics and Institutions of Innovation 82, Royal Institute of Technology, CESIS - Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies.
    5. Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-781, August.
    6. Felipa de Mello-Sampayo, 2009. "Competing-destinations gravity model: an application to the geographic distribution of FDI," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(17), pages 2237-2253.
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    More about this item


    Ownership structure; one share-one vote; proportionality; performance; entrenchment;

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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