One Share-One Vote: New Empirical Evidence
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More about this item
KeywordsOwnership structure; one share-one vote; proportionality; performance; entrenchment;
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-03-12 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CFN-2011-03-12 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-POL-2011-03-12 (Positive Political Economics)
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