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On Strategic Ignorance of Environmental Harm and Social Norms

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Abstract

Are people strategically ignorant of the negative externalities their activities cause the environment? Herein we examine if people avoid costless information on those externalities and use ignorance as an excuse to reduce pro-environmental behavior. We develop a theoretical framework in which people feel guilt from causing harm to the environment (e.g., emitting carbon dioxide) and from deviating from the social norm for pro-environmental behavior (e.g., offsetting carbon emissions). Our model predicts that people may benefit from avoiding information on their harm to the environment, and that they use ignorance as an excuse to engage in less pro-environmental behavior. It also predicts that the cost of ignorance increases if people can learn about the social norm from the information. We test the model predictions empirically with an experiment that involves an imaginary long- distance flight and an option to buy offsets for the flight’s carbon footprint. More than half (53 percent) of the subjects choose to ignore information on the carbon footprint alone before deciding their offset purchase, but ignorance significantly decreases (to 29 percent) when the information additionally reveals the social norm, namely the share of air travelers who buy carbon offsets. We find evidence that some people use ignorance as an excuse to reduce pro-environmental behavior— ignorance significantly decreases the probability of buying carbon offsets.

Suggested Citation

  • Thunström, Linda & van 't Veld, Klaas & Shogren, Jason F. & Nordström, Jonas, 2013. "On Strategic Ignorance of Environmental Harm and Social Norms," Working Papers 2013:22, Lund University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2013_022
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    1. Tara Larson & C. Monica Capra, 2009. "Exploiting moral wiggle room: Illusory preference for fairness? A comment," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 4(6), pages 467-474, October.
    2. Jason Dana & Roberto Weber & Jason Kuang, 2007. "Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 33(1), pages 67-80, October.
    3. Linda Thunström & Jonas Nordström & Jason F. Shogren & Mariah Ehmke & Klaas Veld, 2016. "Strategic self-ignorance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 117-136, April.
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    2. Mata, André & Vaz, André & Mendonça, Bernardo, 2022. "Deliberate ignorance in moral dilemmas: Protecting judgment from conflicting information," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    3. Nordström, Jonas & Thunström, Linda & Van ’T Veld, Klaas & Shogren, Jason F. & Ehmke, Mariah, 2023. "Strategic ignorance of health risk: its causes and policy consequences," Behavioural Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 83-114, January.
    4. Edenbrandt, Anna Kristina & Lagerkvist, Carl Johan & Nordström, Jonas, 2020. "Interested, indifferent or active information avoider of climate labels: Cognitive dissonance and ascription of responsibility as motivating factors," AgriFood-WP 2020:1, Lund University, AgriFood Economics Centre.
    5. Eleonora Freddi, 2021. "Do People Avoid Morally Relevant Information? Evidence from the Refugee Crisis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 103(4), pages 605-620, October.
    6. Davide Pace & Joël van der Weele, 2020. "Curbing Carbon: An Experiment on Uncertainty and Information about CO2 emissions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 20-059/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    7. Capitán, Tabaré & Thunstrom, Linda & van 't Veld, Klaas & Nordström, Jonas & Shogren, Jason F., 2024. "Show me the labels: Using pre-nudges to reduce calorie information avoidance," SocArXiv vy6af, Center for Open Science.
    8. Edenbrandt, Anna Kristina & Lagerkvist, Carl Johan & Nordström, Jonas, 2021. "Interested, indifferent or active information avoiders of carbon labels: Cognitive dissonance and ascription of responsibility as motivating factors," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    9. Innocenti, Federico & Rohde, Linnéa Marie, 2025. "Selective exposure reduces voluntary contributions: Experimental evidence from the German Internet Panel," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).
    10. Alexander J. Stein & Marcelo Lima, 2022. "Sustainable food labelling: considerations for policy-makers," Review of Agricultural, Food and Environmental Studies, Springer, vol. 103(2), pages 143-160, June.
    11. Konstantin Offer & Dorothee Mischkowski & Zoe Rahwan & Christoph Engel, 2024. "Deliberately Ignoring Unfairness: Responses to Uncertain Inequality in the Ultimatum Game," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2024_06, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
    12. repec:osf:socarx:vy6af_v1 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Mello, Fabiana Peixoto de, 2024. "Voluntary carbon offset programs in aviation: A systematic literature review," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 158-168.

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    JEL classification:

    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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