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Putting social preferences to work: Can revealed preferences predict real effort provision?

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  • Foster, Joshua

Abstract

This paper presents a model of real effort provision in conjunction with rational social preference theory to predict how individuals exert effort to replace an exogenously determined “state of the world” with a preferred social outcome. Binary dictator games and real effort tasks are used to examine whether individuals exert effort in a manner that is consistent with their revealed preferences. The analysis of controlled laboratory experiments suggest that while individuals’ effort provisions are generally consistent with the theory, those who reveal relatively pro-social preferences fail to procure their “preferred” outcomes too frequently when the state of the world is highly inequitable in their favor. Consideration is given to alternative theories, namely ego depletion and cognitive dissonance, as potential explanations of social outcomes. There is evidence to suggest that dictators, on average, experience ego depletion which leads to a reduction in pro-social behavior through time.

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  • Foster, Joshua, 2014. "Putting social preferences to work: Can revealed preferences predict real effort provision?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 128-140.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:45:y:2014:i:c:p:128-140
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2014.08.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Foster, Joshua, 2020. "Loss aversion and sunk cost sensitivity in all-pay auctions for charity: Theory and experiments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 84(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social preferences; Real effort; Revealed preference; Ego depletion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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