Belling the cat: Eli F. Heckscher on the gold standard as a discipline device
Unlike Knut Wicksell, Eli Heckscher did not believe the time had arrived for “managed money” to replace the gold standard after World War I. The war had shown that only a gold standard could bind the central bank to a time-consistent policy with reasonable price stability. Heckscher likened the problem of reinstating the gold standard to “Belling the cat” in Aesop’s fable. When the international gold standard crumbled in the Great Depression, he supported the Swedish price stabilization regime as a temporary system. Heckscher was an early discoverer of the time-consistency problem in monetary policy and hence stressed the importance of the institutional framework of monetary policy.
|Date of creation:||14 Jun 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published as Fregert, Klas, 'Belling the cat: Eli F. Heckscher on the gold standard as a discipline device' in History of Political Economy, 2013, pages 39-59.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/en
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Berg, Claes & Jonung, Lars, 1999.
"Pioneering price level targeting: The Swedish experience 1931-1937,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 525-551, June.
- Berg, Claes & Jonung, Lars, 1998. "Pioneering Price Level Targeting: The Swedish Experience 1931-1937," Seminar Papers 642, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Berg, C. & Jonung, L., 1998. "Pioneering Price Level Targeting: The Swedish Experience 1931-1937," Papers 642, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Berg, Claes & Jonung, Lars, 1998. "Pioneering Price Level Targeting:The Swedish Experience 1931-1937," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 290, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Horn, Henrik & Persson, Torsten, 1988. "Exchange rate policy, wage formation and credibility," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(8), pages 1621-1636, October.
- Newby, E., 2008.
"The Suspension of the Gold Standard as Sustainable Monetary Policy,"
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics
0856, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Newby, Elisa, 2012. "The suspension of the gold standard as sustainable monetary policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(10), pages 1498-1519.
- Elisa Newby, 2009. " The Suspension of the Gold Standard as Sustainable Monetary Policy," CDMA Conference Paper Series 0907, Centre for Dynamic Macroeconomic Analysis.
- Mauro Boianovsky, 1998. "Wicksell on Deflation in the Early 1920s," History of Political Economy, Duke University Press, vol. 30(2), pages 219-275, Summer.
- Bordo Michael D. & Kydland Finn E., 1995. "The Gold Standard As a Rule: An Essay in Exploration," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 423-464, October.
- Carlson, Benny, 2009. "Who Was Most World-Famous – Cassel Or Keynes? The Economist As Yardstick," Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(04), pages 519-530, December.
- Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983.
"Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Carl E. Walsh, 2002. "When should central bankers be fired?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-21, 03.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
- Taylor, John B., 1983. "`Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy' by Robert J. Barro and David B. Gordon," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 123-125.
- Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2011_019. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David Edgerton)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.