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Do Mergers Result in Collusion?


  • Ganslandt, Mattias

    () (The Research Institute of Industrial Economics)

  • Norbäck, Pehr-Johan

    () (The Research Institute of Industrial Economics)


We examine coordinated effects of mergers in the Swedish retail market for gasoline during the period 1986-2002. Despite significant changes in market concentration and many factors conductive to coordination, the empirical analysis shows that the level of coordination is low. In addition, statistical tests reject the hypothesis that mergers and acquisitions result in "coordinated effects". In particular, higher market concentration does not result in more collusive behavior and, consequently, the relevance of simple "checklists" in merger control can be questioned.

Suggested Citation

  • Ganslandt, Mattias & Norbäck, Pehr-Johan, 2004. "Do Mergers Result in Collusion?," Working Paper Series 621, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0621

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Slade, Margaret E, 1998. "Beer and the Tie: Did Divestiture of Brewer-Owned Public Houses Lead to Higher Beer Prices?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(448), pages 565-602, May.
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    7. Karen Clay & Werner Troesken, 2003. "Further Tests of Static Oligopoly Models: Whiskey, 1882-1898," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(2), pages 151-166, June.
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    9. Jacquemin, Alexis & Slade, Margaret E., 1989. "Cartels, collusion, and horizontal merger," Handbook of Industrial Organization,in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 415-473 Elsevier.
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    More about this item


    Merger Control; Collusion; Coordinated Effects; Oligopolistic Dominance; Competition Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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