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Screening stringency in the disability insurance program


  • Johansson, Per

    () (IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy)

  • Laun, Lisa

    () (IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy)

  • Laun, Tobias

    () (Department of Economics, Uppsala University)


We propose a strategy for assessing how the inflow to the disability insurance program has been governed over time. We analyze the ex-ante health of individuals entering the program, compared to individuals not entering the program in the same year, by using ex-post mortality. Applying the strategy to Sweden, we find large variation in the relative health of new beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries over time. Some of the fluctuations correspond well to formal changes to screening stringency. However, we also find large variation in health during periods when no changes to formal eligibility criteria have been pursued.

Suggested Citation

  • Johansson, Per & Laun, Lisa & Laun, Tobias, 2013. "Screening stringency in the disability insurance program," Working Paper Series 2013:10, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:ifauwp:2013_010

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Kevin S. Milligan & David A. Wise, 2012. "Health and Work at Older Ages: Using Mortality to Assess the Capacity to Work across Countries," NBER Working Papers 18229, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Andreas Kuhn & Jean-Philippe Wuellrich & Josef Zweimüller, 2010. "Fatal attraction? Access to early retirement and mortality," IEW - Working Papers 499, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    3. Parsons, Donald O, 1991. "Self-Screening in Targeted Public Transfer Programs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 859-876, August.
    4. Karlström, Anders & Palme, Mårten & Svensson, Ingemar, 2008. "The employment effect of stricter rules for eligibility for DI: Evidence from a natural experiment in Sweden," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2071-2082, October.
    5. Mark Duggan & Scott A. Imberman, 2009. "Why Are the Disability Rolls Skyrocketing? The Contribution of Population Characteristics, Economic Conditions, and Program Generosity," NBER Chapters,in: Health at Older Ages: The Causes and Consequences of Declining Disability among the Elderly, pages 337-379 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Staubli, Stefan, 2011. "The impact of stricter criteria for disability insurance on labor force participation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(9-10), pages 1223-1235, October.
    7. Gruber, Jonathan & Kubik, Jeffrey D., 1997. "Disability insurance rejection rates and the labor supply of older workers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 1-23, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Per Johansson & Lisa Laun & Mårten Palme, 2014. "Pathways to Retirement and the Role of Financial Incentives in Sweden," NBER Chapters,in: Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World: Disability Insurance Programs and Retirement, pages 369-410 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Sergi JimeÌ nez-MartiÌ n & Arnau Juanmarti Mestres & Judit Vall Castello, 2017. "Hiring subsidies for people with disabilities: Do they work?," Policy Papers 2017-11, FEDEA.
    3. Werner Eichhorst & Tito Boeri & An De Coen & Vincenzo Galasso & Michael Kendzia & Nadia Steiber, 2014. "How to combine the entry of young people in the labour market with the retention of older workers?," IZA Journal of European Labor Studies, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 3(1), pages 1-23, December.
    4. Tobias Laun & Johanna Wallenius, 2016. "Social Insurance and Retirement: A Cross-Country Perspective," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 22, pages 72-92, October.
    5. Eichhorst, Werner & Boeri, Tito & Braga, Michela & De Coen, An & Galasso, Vincenzo & Gerard, Maarten & Kendzia, Michael J. & Mayrhuber, Christine & Pedersen, Jakob Louis & Schmidl, Ricarda & Steiber, , 2013. "Report No. 53: Combining the Entry of Young People in the Labour Market with the Retention of Older Workers," IZA Research Reports 53, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

    More about this item


    Disability insurance; screening stringency; proportional hazard model;

    JEL classification:

    • C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • J14 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-Labor Market Discrimination

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