IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/eijswp/0187.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Changing Pattern of Amakudari Appointments - The Case of Regional Banks 1991-2000

Author

Listed:
  • Suzuki, Kenji

    (European Institute of Japanese Studies)

Abstract

Amakudari, or the reemployment of the officials retired from the government into senior management positions in private companies, is one of the informal institutions most frequently mentioned in the literature of Japanese political economy. However, few studies have examined it systematically. Focusing on the reemployment from Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan into regional banks, this study discusses the mechanism of amakudari appointments and its change over time. Four different perspectives (human resource, communication, monitoring and compensation) are presented, and their validity is tested by an empirical analysis with the panel data of 96 regional banks from 1991 to 2000. The result shows that the appointment of a retiree from a ministry at the retirement of a predecessor from the same ministry (chain appointment) is no longer the case. On the other hand, it is also found that amakudari is more likely to occur at more profitable/ safer banks than others, which supports the traditional argument that amakudari is used as a compensation for retired bureaucrats.

Suggested Citation

  • Suzuki, Kenji, 2004. "The Changing Pattern of Amakudari Appointments - The Case of Regional Banks 1991-2000," EIJS Working Paper Series 187, Stockholm School of Economics, The European Institute of Japanese Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:eijswp:0187
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://swopec.hhs.se/eijswp/papers/eijswp0187.pdf
    File Function: Complete Rendering
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Blomstrom, Magnus & Gangnes, Byron & La Croix, Sumner (ed.), 2001. "Japan's New Economy: Continuity and Change in the Twenty-First Century," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199241736, Decembrie.
    2. Hassink, Wolter & van Rixtel, Adrian, 1998. "Monitoring the Monitors: Amakudari and the Ex-Post Monitoring of Private Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 1785, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Horiuchi, Akiyoshi & Shimizu, Katsutoshi, 2001. "Did amakudari undermine the effectiveness of regulator monitoring in Japan?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 573-596, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tetsuro Mizoguchi & Nguyen Van Quyen, 2009. "Amakudari: The Post-Retirement Employment of Elite Bureaucrats in Japan," Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Discussion Paper Series 2009-011, Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Program.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Suzuki, Kenji, 2004. "Is Amakudari Changing? The Case of Regional Banks," EIJS Working Paper Series 198, Stockholm School of Economics, The European Institute of Japanese Studies.
    2. Imai, Masami, 2019. "Regulatory responses to banking crisis: Lessons from Japan," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 10-16.
    3. Kyoji Fukao & Kiyohiko Nishimura & Qing-Yuan Sui & Masayo Tomiyama, 2005. "Japanese Banks’ monitoring activities and the performance of borrower firms: 1981–1996," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 337-362, December.
    4. Selim Mankaï & Aymen Belgacem, 2013. "Interactions Between Risk-Taking, Capital, and Reinsurance for Property-Liability Insurance Firms," EconomiX Working Papers 2013-23, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    5. Asai, Kentaro & Kawai, Kei & Nakabayashi, Jun, 2021. "Regulatory capture in public procurement: Evidence from revolving door bureaucrats in Japan," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 186(C), pages 328-343.
    6. Hanazaki, Masaharu & 花崎, 正晴 & ハナザキ, マサハル & Souma, Toshiyuki & 相馬, 利行 & ソウマ, トシユキ & Wiwattanakantang, Yupana & ウィワッタナカンタン, ユパナ, 2004. "Silent Large Shareholders and Entrenched Bank Management: Evidence from the Banking Crisis in Japan," CEI Working Paper Series 2004-1, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    7. Sumner J. La Croix & Denise Eby Konan, 2002. "Intellectual Property Rights in China: The Changing Political Economy of Chinese–American Interests," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(6), pages 759-788, June.
    8. Hanazaki, Masaharu & 花崎, 正晴 & ハナザキ, マサハル & Horiuchi, Akiyoshi & 堀内, 昭義 & ホリウチ, アキヨシ, 2002. "A Review of Japan's Bank Crisis from the Governance Perspective," CEI Working Paper Series 2002-3, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    9. Tetsuro Mizoguchi & Nguyen Van Quyen, 2009. "Amakudari: The Post-Retirement Employment of Elite Bureaucrats in Japan," Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Discussion Paper Series 2009-011, Keio/Kyoto Joint Global COE Program.
    10. Fukunari Kimura & Kozo Kiyota, 2007. "Foreign‐owned versus Domestically‐owned Firms: Economic Performance in Japan," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(1), pages 31-48, February.
    11. Hanazaki, Masaharu & Horiuchi, Akiyoshi, 2003. "A review of Japan's bank crisis from the governance perspective," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 305-325, July.
    12. James Mak & Lonny Carlile & Sally Dai, 2004. "Impact of Population Aging on Japanese International Travel," Working Papers 200408, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    13. Grossman, Richard S. & Imai, Masami, 2016. "Taking the lord's name in vain: The impact of connected directors on 19th century British banks," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 75-93.
    14. Charles Yuji Horioka, 2006. "The Dissaving of the Aged Revisited: The Case of Japan," ISER Discussion Paper 0665, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    15. Serdat Dinc & Patrick M. McGuire, 2004. "Did investors regard real estate as 'safe' during the 'Japanese Bubble' in the 1980s?," BIS Working Papers 164, Bank for International Settlements.
    16. Jiatao Li & Carmen Ng, 2013. "The Normalization of Deviant Organizational Practices: The Non-performing Loans Problem in China," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 114(4), pages 643-653, June.
    17. Heechul Min, 2011. "Former Officials and Subsidies to State-owned Enterprises," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 36(2), pages 1-13, June.
    18. Wang, Qiang & Chen, Xi, 2012. "Regulatory failures for nuclear safety – the bad example of Japan – implication for the rest of world," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 2610-2617.
    19. Katsutoshi Shimizu, 2009. "The Behavior of Japanese banks in the 1990s and Government Intervention for the Financial crisis," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 5(2), pages 229-254, November.
    20. Hsin-Yi Yu & Brian G. M. Main, 2012. "Political Intervention, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation in Japan and Taiwan," Accounting and Finance Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 1(1), pages 134-134, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    amakudari; financial supervision; Japan; incentives of regulator;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:eijswp:0187. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Nanhee Lee (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/eihhsse.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.