The Changing Pattern of Amakudari Appointments - The Case of Regional Banks 1991-2000
Amakudari, or the reemployment of the officials retired from the government into senior management positions in private companies, is one of the informal institutions most frequently mentioned in the literature of Japanese political economy. However, few studies have examined it systematically. Focusing on the reemployment from Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan into regional banks, this study discusses the mechanism of amakudari appointments and its change over time. Four different perspectives (human resource, communication, monitoring and compensation) are presented, and their validity is tested by an empirical analysis with the panel data of 96 regional banks from 1991 to 2000. The result shows that the appointment of a retiree from a ministry at the retirement of a predecessor from the same ministry (chain appointment) is no longer the case. On the other hand, it is also found that amakudari is more likely to occur at more profitable/ safer banks than others, which supports the traditional argument that amakudari is used as a compensation for retired bureaucrats.
|Date of creation:||22 Jan 2004|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: The European Institute of Japanese Studies, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden|
Web page: http://www.hhs.se/en/Research/Institutes/EIJS/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Horiuchi, Akiyoshi & Shimizu, Katsutoshi, 2001. "Did amakudari undermine the effectiveness of regulator monitoring in Japan?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 573-596, March.
- Hassink, Wolter & van Rixtel, Adrian, 1998. "Monitoring the Monitors: Amakudari and the Ex-Post Monitoring of Private Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 1785, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:eijswp:0187. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Nanhee Lee)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.