Effect of Amakudari on Bank Performance in the Post-Bubble Period
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- Hassink, Wolter & van Rixtel, Adrian, 1998. "Monitoring the Monitors: Amakudari and the Ex-Post Monitoring of Private Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 1785, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991.
"Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations,"
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Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
- Tom Doan, "undated". "RATS program to replicate Arellano-Bond 1991 dynamic panel," Statistical Software Components RTZ00169, Boston College Department of Economics.
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- Asano, Akihito & Eto, Takaharu, 2006. "The paradox of limited deposit insurance under the amakudari practice in the Japanese banking system," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 126-143, February.
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Keywordsamakudari; financial supervision; Japan; incentives of regulator; post-bubble;
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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