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Effect of Amakudari on Bank Performance in the Post-Bubble Period


  • Suzuki, Kenji

    () (European Institute of Japanese Studies)


One of the curiosities about the Japanese banking sector for Westerners is the close connection between banks and the financial authority, namely Ministry of Finance (MoF). One of the important sources of this connection is the practice called amakudari. Amakudari symbolizes the practice under which retired government officials "descend from their heaven" to be employed in the private sector. The practice has long been carried out in the banking sector, as well as other industrial sectors in Japan. Previous studies, particularily Horiuchi and Shimizu (2001), examined the effect of the close connection between banks and the financial authority in Japan, so-called amakudari. However, their observation did not cover the "post-bubble" period in which one may expect some changes. The present study re-examines this amakudari practice adopting the latest data, redesigning and developing the previous model. It found that the overall effect of amakudari was reduced through the 1990's, but this is just because of the reduction of amakudari appointments. In fact, the gap between the banks with amakudari and the others became wider in recent years.

Suggested Citation

  • Suzuki, Kenji, 2001. "Effect of Amakudari on Bank Performance in the Post-Bubble Period," EIJS Working Paper Series 136, Stockholm School of Economics, The European Institute of Japanese Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:eijswp:0136

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Hassink, Wolter & van Rixtel, Adrian, 1998. "Monitoring the Monitors: Amakudari and the Ex-Post Monitoring of Private Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 1785, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Manuel Arellano & Stephen Bond, 1991. "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 277-297.
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    Cited by:

    1. Asano, Akihito & Eto, Takaharu, 2006. "The paradox of limited deposit insurance under the amakudari practice in the Japanese banking system," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 126-143, February.

    More about this item


    amakudari; financial supervision; Japan; incentives of regulator; post-bubble;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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