Optimal Cap on Pension Contributions
In our model, the government operates a mandatory proportional (contributive) pension system to substitute for the low life-cycle savings of the low-paid myopes. The socially optimal contribution rate is high (equalizing young- and old-age consumption for them), while an appropriate cap on pension contributions makes room for the saving of high-paid far-sighted workers. In our parameterization (with a Pareto earning distribution), the optimal cap can be determined but its aggregate impact is negligible.
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