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Optimal Compulsion when Behavioral Biases Vary and the State Errs

Author

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  • Salvador Valdés-Prieto
  • Ursula Schwarzhaupt

Abstract

When behavioral biases have varying sizes, and the State seeks to correct behavior through compulsion, the question is how to design optimal compulsion. One argument is that the amount of compulsion should rise with the size of the bias to be “cured”. A contrary argument is that since compulsion affects actions, and recommended actions are independent from the bias, the amount of compulsion should not depend on the bias. This puzzle is solved for the case where individuals are affected by a bias that leads them to under-save, acknowledging that the planner predicts each individual’s optimal action with error. Since only low-bias individuals are able to correct the planner’s mistakes when mandated to save too little, but not in the opposite direction due to a costly spread, the optimal amount of compulsion rises with the predicted bias. As an application, the paper explores a behavioral rationale for a Maximum for Taxable Earnings (MTE). It finds that if (1) the State’s information is limited to current earnings; (2) earnings do not influence the earnings ratio for old age; and (3) the bias is smaller only for the highest earnings quintile, then a MTE near the 80th percentile of the earnings distribution is optimal.

Suggested Citation

  • Salvador Valdés-Prieto & Ursula Schwarzhaupt, 2011. "Optimal Compulsion when Behavioral Biases Vary and the State Errs," CESifo Working Paper Series 3316, CESifo Group Munich.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3316
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    File URL: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp3316.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Homburg, Stefan, 2000. "Compulsory savings in the welfare state," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 233-239, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andras Simonovits, 2012. "Optimal Cap on Pension Contributions," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1208, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
    2. András Simonovits, 2015. "Socially optimal contribution rate and cap in a proportional (DC) pension system," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 14(1), pages 45-63, December.
    3. Stefan Domonkos & Andras Simonovits, 2016. "Pensions in transition in EU11 countries between 1990 and 2015," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1615, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
    4. András Simonovits, 2014. "Design Errors in Public Pension Systems: The Case of Hungary," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1414, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    behavioral bias; compulsion; optimal policy; time-inconsistency; overoptimism; pensions; maximum taxable earnings;

    JEL classification:

    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies

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