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Designing a linear pension scheme with forced savings and wage heterogeneity

Author

Listed:
  • CREMER, Helmuth
  • DE DONDER, Philippe
  • MALDONADO, Dario
  • PESTIEAU, Pierre

Abstract

This paper studies the optimal linear pension scheme when society consists of rational and myopic individuals. Myopic individuals have, ex ante, a strong preference for the present even though, ex post, they would regret not to have saved enough. While rational and myopic persons share the same ex post intertemporal preferences, only the rational agents make their savings decisions according to these preferences. Individuals are also distinguished by their productivity. The social objective is ?paternalistic?: the utilitarian welfare function depends on ex post utilities. We examine how the presence of myopic individuals affects both the size of the pension system and the degree of redistribution it operates. The relationship between proportion of myopic individuals and characteristics of the pension system turns out to be much more complex than one would have conjectured. Neither the impact on the level of pensions nor the effect on their redistributive degree are unambiguous. Nevertheless, we show that under some plausible assumptions adding myopic individuals increases the level of pension benefits and leads to a shift from a flat or even targeted scheme to a partially contributory one. However, we also provide an example where the degree of redistribution is not a monotonic function of the proportion of myopic individuals.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • CREMER, Helmuth & DE DONDER, Philippe & MALDONADO, Dario & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2009. "Designing a linear pension scheme with forced savings and wage heterogeneity," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2040
    DOI: 10.1007/s10797-007-9031-2
    Note: In : International Tax Public Finance, 15, 547-562, 2008
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    Cited by:

    1. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2011. "Myopia, redistribution and pensions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 165-175, February.
    2. Chiara Canta & Marie-Louise Leroux, 2024. "Financial education as a complement to public pensions: the case of naive individuals," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 37(4), pages 1-30, December.
    3. Matteo Bassi, 2008. "An Egg Today and a Chicken Tomorrow: A Model of Social Security with Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting," CSEF Working Papers 205, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    4. Barigozzi, Francesca & Cremer, Helmuth & Roeder, Kerstin, 2020. "Caregivers in the family: Daughters, sons and social norms," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    5. Caliendo, Frank N. & Guo, Nick L., 2014. "Roosevelt And Prescott Come To An Agreement," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(6), pages 1383-1402, September.
    6. Pier-André Bouchard St-Amant & Louis Perrault, 2019. "Poverty and Savings: Optimal Taxes with Endogenous Discount Factors," Public Finance Review, , vol. 47(5), pages 828-863, September.
    7. Guo, Nick L. & Caliendo, Frank N., 2014. "Time-inconsistent preferences and time-inconsistent policies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 102-108.
    8. Caliendo, Frank N., 2011. "Time-inconsistent preferences and social security: Revisited in continuous time," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 668-675, May.
    9. Kerstin Roeder, 2009. "Optimal taxes and pensions in a society with myopic agents," Working Papers 2009/28, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    10. Bagchi, Shantanu, 2015. "Labor supply and the optimality of Social Security," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 167-185.
    11. Gahramanov Emin, 2016. "On the Demographics and the Severity of the Social Security Crisis," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1001-1028, April.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

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