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Monetary Easing, Leveraged Payouts and Lack of Investment

Author

Listed:
  • Viral V Acharya

    (NYU - New York University [New York] - NYU - NYU System)

  • Guillaume Plantin

    (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper studies a model in which a low monetary policy rate lowers the cost of capital for entrepreneurs, potentially spurring productive investment. Low interest rates, however, also induce entrepreneurs to lever up so as to increase payouts to equity. Whereas such leveraged payouts privately benefit entrepreneurs, they come at the social cost of reducing their incentives thereby lowering productivity and discouraging investment. If leverage is unregulated (for example, due to the presence of a shadow-banking system), then the optimal monetary policy seeks to contain such socially costly leveraged payouts by stimulating investment in response to adverse shocks only up to a level below the first-best. The optimal monetary policy may even consist of "leaning against the wind," i.e., not stimulating the economy at all, in order to fully contain leveraged payouts and maintain productive efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Viral V Acharya & Guillaume Plantin, 2019. "Monetary Easing, Leveraged Payouts and Lack of Investment," Working Papers hal-03792101, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03792101
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03792101
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jeremy C. Stein, 2012. "Monetary Policy as Financial Stability Regulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(1), pages 57-95.
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    9. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/hqvfahst79ekpe0losvq1h46k is not listed on IDEAS
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