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Prudential Policy with Distorted Beliefs

Author

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  • Walther, Ansgar
  • Dávila, Eduardo

Abstract

This paper studies leverage regulation and monetary policy when equity investors and/or creditors have distorted beliefs relative to a planner. We characterize how the optimal leverage regulation responds to arbitrary changes in investors' and creditors' beliefs and relate our results to practical scenarios. We show that the optimal regulation depends on the type and magnitude of such changes. Optimism by investors calls for looser leverage regulation, while optimism by creditors, or jointly by both investors and creditors, calls for tighter leverage regulation. Monetary policy should be tightened (loosened) in response to either investors' or creditors' optimism (pessimism).

Suggested Citation

  • Walther, Ansgar & Dávila, Eduardo, 2021. "Prudential Policy with Distorted Beliefs," CEPR Discussion Papers 16197, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:16197
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    2. Haddad, Valentin & Ho, Paul & Loualiche, Erik, 2022. "Bubbles and the value of innovation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 69-84.
    3. Bizzarri, Matteo & d’Arienzo, Daniele, 2024. "The social value of overreaction to information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    4. Gai, Prasanna & Haworth, Cameron, 2023. "Macroprudential policymakers with cautious expectations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
    5. Yang Hao, 2023. "Financial Market with Learning from Price under Knightian Uncertainty," Working Papers hal-03686748, HAL.
    6. Florian Schuster & Marco Wysietzki & Jonas Zdrzalek, 2023. "How Heterogeneous Beliefs Trigger Financial Crises," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 238, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    7. Fontanier, Paul, 2025. "Optimal policy for behavioral financial crises," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    8. Antoine Camous & Alejandro Van der Ghote, 2025. "Evaluating the Financial Instability Hypothesis: a Positive and Normative Analysis of Leveraged Risk-Taking and Extrapolative Expectations," Working papers 1009, Banque de France.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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