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Regulating sovereign wealth funds operating overseas through an external fund manager

  • André De Palma

    (ENS Cachan - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan - École normale supérieure de Cachan - ENS Cachan, Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

  • Luc Leruth

    (IMF Office in Europe - EUO)

  • Adnan Mazarei

    (Middle East and Central Asia Department of the IMF - IMF)

This article looks at the relationship between SWFs and their recipient countries, with a focus on the impact it may have depending on the nature of the objectives pursued by the SWF from the perspective of a principal-agent framework. In particular, when the SWF has multiple objectives, there is a risk that signals are misinterpreted and lead to misguided reactions by authorities in the recipient country. Thus, hard to interpret signals do not provide a sufficient case for imposing constraints on the SWF. However, we will show that requiring the SWF to invest through intermediary asset managers may foster cooperation, especially when the objectives of the SWF and of the authorities are closely aligned. SWFs may also alleviate the concerns in recipient countries by acting as an investor (and accepting the funds) of other SWF and non-SWF investors.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00488662.

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Date of creation: 02 Jun 2010
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00488662
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00488662/en/
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  1. Sushil Bikhchandani & David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, 2010. "A theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom and cultural change as informational Cascades," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1193, David K. Levine.
  2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Pouyet, Jérôme, 2000. "The Subsidiarity Bias in Regulation," IDEI Working Papers 96, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  3. Jean-Philippe Chancelier & Michel De Lara & André de Palma, 2007. "Risk aversion in expected intertemporal discounted utilities bandit problems," THEMA Working Papers 2007-15, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  4. Christine A. Parlour & Uday Rajan, 2001. "Competition in Loan Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1311-1328, December.
  5. Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2004. "Incentives for Corruptible Auditors in the Absence of Commitment," Working Papers UWEC-2003-02-FC, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
  6. Edwin M. Truman, 2007. "Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Need for Greater Transparency and Accountability," Policy Briefs PB07-6, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
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