Optimal allocation of tradable emission permits under upstream-downstream strategic interaction
In this paper we account for the fact that Cournot equilibrium strategies in the sector under environmental regulation depend on firms'interaction in the permits market (and vice versa). In this context, we show that the cost-effective allocation of permits between firms must compensate the cost-rising strategies exercised by the stronger firm (in the output market). Then, taking into account the previous result, we use a simulation to obtain the optimal allocation of permits between firms as a function of output market characteristics, in particular as a function of goods substitutability that serves as an indicator for the de- gree of price competition. The simulation allows us to determine how output market characteristics affect differently optimal permit allocation depending on the regulator's objective.
|Date of creation:||01 Dec 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00437645|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pedro Linares & Francisco Javier Santos & Mariano Ventosa & Luis Lapiedra, 2006. "Impacts of the European Emissions Trading Scheme Directive and Permit Assignment Methods on the Spanish Electricity Sector," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 79-98.
- Nils-Henrik Mørch von der Fehr, 1993.
"Tradable emission rights and strategic interaction,"
Environmental & Resource Economics,
European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(2), pages 129-151, April.
- Morch von der Fehr, N-H., 1991. "Tradable Emission Rights and Strategic Interaction," Memorandum 11/1991, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Montgomery, W. David, 1972. "Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 395-418, December.
- Misiolek, Walter S. & Elder, Harold W., 1989. "Exclusionary manipulation of markets for pollution rights," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 156-166, March.
- Michael A. Salinger, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 103(2), pages 345-356.
- Catherine Boemare & Philippe Quirion, 2002.
"Implementing greenhouse gas trading in Europe: lessons from economic literature and international experiences,"
- Boemare, Catherine & Quirion, Philippe, 2002. "Implementing greenhouse gas trading in Europe: lessons from economic literature and international experiences," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2-3), pages 213-230, December.
- Hahn, Robert W., 1982. "Market Power and Transferable Property Rights," Working Papers 402, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Ordover, Janusz A & Saloner, Garth & Salop, Steven C, 1990. "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 127-42, March.
- Yihsu Chen & Benjamin Hobbs & Sven Leyffer & Todd Munson, 2006. "Leader-Follower Equilibria for Electric Power and NO x Allowances Markets," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 307-330, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00437645. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.