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Crucial Materials? How Export Restrictions Upstream Boost Manufacturing Exports Downstream

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  • Eva Wichmann

Abstract

This paper shows both theoretically and empirically how raw material rich countries use export restrictions upstream to give manufacturing sectors downstream a competitive advantage. For young and relatively small industries this can be seen as a type of infant industry protection that takes advantage of the global value chain. Estimating a fixed effect model, I provide evidence that export restrictions on industrial raw materials upstream help promote manufacturing exports downstream.

Suggested Citation

  • Eva Wichmann, 2017. "Crucial Materials? How Export Restrictions Upstream Boost Manufacturing Exports Downstream," FIW Working Paper series 181, FIW.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsr:wpaper:y:2017:i:181
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • L61 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Metals and Metal Products; Cement; Glass; Ceramics
    • L71 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels
    • Q3 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation

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