Public Transit Capacity and Users' Choice: AnExperiment on Downs-Thomson Paradox
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- Laurent Denant-Boemont & Sabrina Hammiche, 2009. "Public Transit Capacity and Users Choice: AnExperiment on Downs-Thomson Paradox," Working Papers halshs-00405501, HAL.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Zhang, Fangni & Yang, Hai & Liu, Wei, 2014. "The Downs–Thomson Paradox with responsive transit service," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 244-263.
More about this item
Keywordstraffic equilibrium; congestion; market entry game; coordination; experimental economics;
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