Dynamic voluntary contributions to a discrete public good:Experimental evidence
We experiment a mechanism for the provision of a discrete public good where individuals are allowed to update upwards their contribution during a fixed time interval. Experimental evidence shows that subjects increase their contributions in order to finance the cost of the good. The public good is financed more frequently when its cost is low relative to the social ability to pay.
|Date of creation:||2008|
|Publication status:||Published in Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, 2008, 3 (23), pp. 1-11|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00282669|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/|
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