IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-04922873.html

Who Gets Hired? Political Patronage and Bureaucratic Favoritism

Author

Listed:
  • Mai Hassan

    (MIT - Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

  • Horacio Larreguy

    (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Stuart Russell

    (BM = WB - La Banque Mondiale = The World Bank - WBG = GBM - World Bank Group = Groupe Banque Mondiale)

Abstract

Most research on biased public sector hiring highlights local politicians' incentives to distribute government positions to partisan supporters. Other studies instead point to the role of bureaucratic managers in allocating government jobs to close contacts. We jointly consider the relative importance of each source of biased hiring as an allocation problem between managers and politicians who have different preferences regarding public sector hiring and different abilities to realize those preferences. We develop a theoretical model of each actor's relative leverage and relative preferences for different types of public sector positions. We empirically examine our theory using the universe of payroll data in Kenyan local governments from 2004 to 2013. We find evidence of both patronage and bureaucratic favoritism, but with different types of bias concentrated in different types of government jobs, as our theory predicts. Our results highlight the inadequacy of examining political patronage alone without incorporating the preferences and leverage of the bureaucratic managers who are intricately involved in hiring processes.

Suggested Citation

  • Mai Hassan & Horacio Larreguy & Stuart Russell, 2024. "Who Gets Hired? Political Patronage and Bureaucratic Favoritism," Post-Print hal-04922873, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04922873
    DOI: 10.1017/S0003055423001338
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04922873v1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-04922873v1/document
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1017/S0003055423001338?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ernesto Calvo & Maria Victoria Murillo, 2004. "Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(4), pages 742-757, October.
    2. Imran Rasul & Daniel Rogger, 2018. "Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(608), pages 413-446, February.
    3. repec:aep:anales:4443 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Pellegrino, Bruno & Zingales, Luigi, 2017. "Diagnosing the Italian Disease," Working Papers 269, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    5. Robin Burgess & Remi Jedwab & Edward Miguel & Ameet Morjaria & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2015. "The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(6), pages 1817-1851, June.
    6. James A. Robinson & Thierry Verdier, 2013. "The Political Economy of Clientelism," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(2), pages 260-291, April.
    7. Goodman-Bacon, Andrew, 2021. "Difference-in-differences with variation in treatment timing," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 225(2), pages 254-277.
    8. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00846558 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Jeremy Bowles & Horacio Larreguy & Shelley Liu, 2020. "How Weakly Institutionalized Parties Monitor Brokers in Developing Democracies: Evidence from Postconflict Liberia," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(4), pages 952-967, October.
    10. Imran Rasul & Daniel Rogger, 2018. "Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(608), pages 413-446, February.
    11. Rogger,Daniel Oliver, 2017. "Who serves the poor ? surveying civil servants in the developing world," Policy Research Working Paper Series 8051, The World Bank.
    12. Horowitz, Jeremy, 2019. "Ethnicity and the Swing Vote in Africa’s Emerging Democracies: Evidence from Kenya," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 901-921, July.
    13. Rogger,Daniel Oliver, 2018. "The consequences of political interference in bureaucratic decision making : evidence from Nigeria," Policy Research Working Paper Series 8554, The World Bank.
    14. Lucy Martin & Pia J. Raffler, 2021. "Fault Lines: The Effects of Bureaucratic Power on Electoral Accountability," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(1), pages 210-224, January.
    15. Sarah Brierley, 2020. "Unprincipled Principals: Co‐opted Bureaucrats and Corruption in Ghana," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(2), pages 209-222, April.
    16. Pierskalla, Jan H & Sacks, Audrey, 2020. "Personnel Politics: Elections, Clientelistic Competition and Teacher Hiring in Indonesia," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 1283-1305, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Callen, Michael & Gulzar, Saad & Hasanain, Ali & Khan, Muhammad Yasir & Rezaee, Arman, 2023. "The political economy of public sector absence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
    2. Danielle Resnick, 2022. "Does Accountability Undermine Service Delivery? The Impact of Devolving Agriculture in Ghana," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 34(2), pages 1003-1029, April.
    3. Kim, Galileu & Kumar, Tanu & Ramalho, Rita & Russell, Stuart Ehrlich, 2026. "Institutional Capacity for Policy Implementation : An Analytical Framework," Policy Research Working Paper Series 11279, The World Bank.
    4. Gauri, Varun & Jamison, Julian C. & Mazar, Nina & Ozier, Owen, 2021. "Motivating bureaucrats through social recognition: External validity—A tale of two states," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 117-131.
    5. Emma Duchini & Victor Lavy & Stephen Machin & Shqiponja Telhaj, 2025. "Personnel policy in public sector organizations: evidence from England's academy schools," CEP Discussion Papers dp2129, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    6. Carlitz, Ruth D. & Ziaja, Sebastian, 2021. "Dissecting aid fragmentation: Development goals and levels of analysis," IDOS Discussion Papers 17/2021, German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).
    7. De La O, Ana L., 2024. "How clientelism undermines state capacity: Evidence from Mexican municipalities," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).
    8. Haus, Martin, 2025. "Breaking Out of Low-Effort Traps: Bureaucratic Leadership by Persuasion," SocArXiv 9zx5w_v1, Center for Open Science.
    9. Agnihotri, Anustubh, 2022. "Transfer preferences of bureaucrats and spatial disparities in local state presence," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
    10. Marta Curto-Grau, 2017. "Voters’ responsiveness to public employment policies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(1), pages 143-169, January.
    11. Liu, Kevin Zhengcheng & Zhang, Xiaoming, 2025. "Discretion, talent allocation, and governance performance: Evidence from China’s imperial bureaucracy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    12. Gurara, Daniel & Kpodar, Kangni & Presbitero, Andrea F. & Tessema, Dawit, 2021. "On the capacity to absorb public investment: How much is too much?☆," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    13. Daniel Gurara & Mr. Kangni R Kpodar & Mr. Andrea F Presbitero & Dawit Tessema, 2020. "On the Capacity to Absorb Public Investment: How Much is Too Much?," IMF Working Papers 2020/048, International Monetary Fund.
    14. Aman-Rana, Shan, 2025. "Meritocracy in a bureaucracy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 175(C).
    15. Aggarwal, Shilpa, 2018. "Do rural roads create pathways out of poverty? Evidence from India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 375-395.
    16. Mizuno, Nobuhiro & Okazawa, Ryosuke, 2025. "A dynamic theory on clientelism and bureaucratic development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 174(C).
    17. Michael Callen & Saad Gulzar & Syed Ali Hasanain & Muhammad Yasir Khan, 2016. "The Political Economy of Public Sector Absence: Experimental Evidence from Pakistan," NBER Working Papers 22340, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Harris, Donna & Borcan , Oana & Serra, Danila & Telli, Henry & Schettini, Bruno & Dercon, Stefan, 2024. "Proud to Belong: The Impact of Ethics Training on Police Officers in Ghana," CEPR Discussion Papers 19141, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Yu Zhang & Lijun Hu & Ruilei Liu, 2025. "Environmental Target Constraint and Corporate Pollution Emissions: Evidence from China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 17(9), pages 1-20, April.
    20. Ghatak, Maitreesh & Wahhaj, Zaki, 2020. "Guilt, Esteem, and Motivational Investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 15172, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04922873. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.