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Nutrition and Climate Policies in the European Union: Friends or Enemies?
[Politiques nutritionnelles et climatiques dans l'Union européenne : Amis ou ennemis ?]

Author

Listed:
  • Basak Bayramoglu

    (UMR PSAE - Paris-Saclay Applied Economics - AgroParisTech - Université Paris-Saclay - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Jean-François Jacques

    (ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12 - Université Gustave Eiffel)

  • Sylvaine Poret

    (Inrae)

Abstract

The European Union (EU) Green Deal and its Farm to Fork Strategy are intended to promote sustainable food systems to achieve EU climate-neutrality by 2050. The Farm to Fork action plan also foresees the introduction of a harmonized mandatory front-of-pack nutrition labelling scheme in 2023. The EU countries have yet to reach agreement on the nutrition labelling scheme, which will also have environmental impacts. This article raises the question of whether at the European level, countries should seek agreements on both climate mitigation and nutrition policies (full agreement as in the case of the Green Deal) or should negotiate separate climate and nutrition policy agreements (as for the nutritional labelling). To address this question, this paper develops a game-theoretic model with multiple countries where each country implements a climate policy and a nutrition policy, We compare the consequences in terms of total emissions, the level of the nutrition policy and the welfare under different institutional arrangements of a non-cooperative equilibrium, full agreement, and three alternative agreements. Our results show in particular that full agreement always leads to the lowest total emissions at the expense of the level of nutrition policy in some cases. In an extension of our analysis, we show that agreements that include cooperation over nutrition policies do not necessarily imply formation of a larger coalition of signatory countries, even if a nutrition policy has positive or negative impacts on emissions.

Suggested Citation

  • Basak Bayramoglu & Jean-François Jacques & Sylvaine Poret, 2023. "Nutrition and Climate Policies in the European Union: Friends or Enemies? [Politiques nutritionnelles et climatiques dans l'Union européenne : Amis ou ennemis ?]," Post-Print hal-04287708, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04287708
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-023-00815-0
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-04287708
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    climate mitigation; nutrition policy; healthy diets; cooperation; agreement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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