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Contingent à l'importation et formation du prix des droits à importer en concurrence imparfaite : le cas de l'Organisation Commune de Marché de la banane dans l'Union européenne

Author

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  • Hervé Guyomard

    (Unité d'économie et sociologie rurales de rennes - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, UAG UFR SM - Université des Antilles et de la Guyane - UFR des sciences médicales - UAG - Université des Antilles et de la Guyane)

  • Chantal Le Mouël

    (Unité d'économie et sociologie rurales de rennes - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, UAG UFR SM - Université des Antilles et de la Guyane - UFR des sciences médicales - UAG - Université des Antilles et de la Guyane)

Abstract

Dans le cadre de l'Organisation commune de marché de la banane (OCMB) instituée dans l'Union européenne (UE) en 1993, celle-ci impose un contingent tarifaire contraignant à ses importations de bananes en provenance d'Amérique latine (bananes "dollar"). Le système de gestion des certificats d'importation (ou droits à importer) lié à ce contingent présente la particularité d'allouer 30 % des droits à des firmes importatrices de bananes en provenance d'origines non soumises au contingent, i. e., les zones ACP (Afrique, Caraïbes et Pacifique) et communautaires. Cet article développe un cadre d'analyse théorique du fonctionnement du marché des certificats d'importation verticalement lié au marché contingenté de la banane dans l'UE. Le modèle développé permet d'analyser l'impact d'éventuels comportements non concurrentiels des firmes importatrices de bananes "dollar" sur la détermination du prix d'équilibre des certificats d'importation et sur le partage de la rente associée au contingent tarifaire entre les différents opérateurs de la filière.

Suggested Citation

  • Hervé Guyomard & Chantal Le Mouël, 1998. "Contingent à l'importation et formation du prix des droits à importer en concurrence imparfaite : le cas de l'Organisation Commune de Marché de la banane dans l'Union européenne," Post-Print hal-01594045, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01594045
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01594045
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hervé Guyomard & Nadine Herrard & Catherine Laroche-Dupraz & Chantal Le Mouël, 1997. "Analyse théorique et empirique du fonctionnement de l'Organisation Commune de Marché de la banane dans l'Union européenne," Working Papers hal-01593913, HAL.
    2. Malueg, David A., 1990. "Welfare consequences of emission credit trading programs," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 66-77, January.
    3. Krishna, Kala, 1993. "Theoretical Implications of Imperfect Competition on Quota License Prices and Auctions," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 7(1), pages 113-136, January.
    4. Krishna, Kala & Erzan, Refik & Tan, Ling Hui, 1994. "Rent Sharing in the Multi-fibre Arrangement: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Apparel Imports from Hong Kong," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 62-73, February.
    5. Hervé Guyomard & Catherine Laroche & Chantal Le Mouel, 1998. "Marché contingenté à l'importation et marché des droits à importer en concurrence imparfaite [Le cas de la banane dans l'Union européenne ]," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 243(1), pages 47-55.
    6. Hervé Guyomard & Nadine Herrard & Catherine Laroche & Chantai Le Mouël, 1997. "L'Organisation commune de marché dans l'Union européenne : impact de la taille du contingent tarifaire appliqué aux bananes dollar et non traditionnelles ACP," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 127(1), pages 15-32.
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