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Marché contingenté à l'importation et marché des droits à importer en concurrence imparfaite [Le cas de la banane dans l'Union européenne ]

Listed author(s):
  • Hervé Guyomard
  • Catherine Laroche
  • Chantal Le Mouel

[fre] L'Organisation commune de marché (OCM) de la banane mise en place dans l'Union européenne (UE) en 1993 repose essentiellement sur la fixation d'un contingent tarifaire à l'importation appliqué aux bananes dites dollar. Les certificats d'importation sont répartis entre les opérateurs A, opérateurs qui avant OCM commercialisaient des fruits dollar sur le marché communautaire, et les opérateurs B qui avant OCM commercialisaient des fruits des pays ACP (Afrique, Caraïbes et Pacifique) favorisés et/ou des territoires communautaires. Les importations de bananes communautaires et traditionnelles ACP ne nécessitent pas de contrepartie papier. L'objet de cet article est de proposer un cadre d'analyse du fonctionnement du marché des certificats d'importation entre les opérateurs A et B, en tenant compte du pouvoir de marché potentiel des opérateurs A sur le marché communautaire des fruits et sur le marché des droits à importer. [eng] Import quota and import rights market with imperfect competition : the case of banana in the European Union The Common Market Organisation (CMO) for bananas in the European Union sets a tariff quota for Latin American and non-traditional ACP (Africa, Carribean and Pacific countries) bananas. Import rights are allocated between A operators (who imported dollar bananas in the pre-CMO regime) and B operators (who imported ACP and European fruits in the pre- CMO regime). In this paper, we develop an analytical framework which allows us to define the equilibrium characteristics on both the banana market and the import rights market. The model takes into account the market power potentially exerted by A operators on these markets.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie rurale.

Volume (Year): 243 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 47-55

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Handle: RePEc:prs:recoru:ecoru_0013-0559_1998_num_243_1_4992
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecoru.1998.4992
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  1. Krishna, Kala & Erzan, Refik & Tan, Ling Hui, 1994. "Rent Sharing in the Multi-fibre Arrangement: Theory and Evidence from U.S. Apparel Imports from Hong Kong," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 62-73, February.
  2. Krishna, Kala, 1993. "Theoretical Implications of Imperfect Competition on Quota License Prices and Auctions," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 7(1), pages 113-136, January.
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