Rent Sharing In The Multi-Fibre Arrangement: Theory And Evidence From Us Apparel Imports From Hong Kong
Available estimates of tariff equivalents of quotas and welfare calculations on the costs of MFA quotas for developing countries are based on the premise of perfect competition in both product and license markets. It is also assumed that the exporting countries which administer the MFA quotas receive all the scarcity rent. We argue that in the presence of market power on the buyers' side in the product market combined with concentration in the license markets, the importing countries may retain part of this rent, i.e. share it with the exporters. We analyze US imports of apparel products from Hong Kong to see if the data conform with all the relevant predictions of the competitive model. Our method essentially tests whether the license price inclusive Hong Kong price, adjusted for tariffs and transport costs, is equal to the domestic (US) price. A deviation between the two prices is taken to indicate rent sharing. We test the hypothesis with homogeneous goods, modify it to take into account compositional differences and, finally, consider differentiated goods. We find evidence that importers retain a substantial portion of the MFA quota rents.
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- Richard E. Baldwin & Paul Krugman, 1986. "Market Access and International Competition: A Simulation Study of 16K Random Access Memories," NBER Working Papers 1936, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Carlos Alfredo Rodriguez, 1979. "The Quality of Imports and the Differential Welfare Effects of Tariffs, Quotas, and Quality Controls as Protective Devices," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 12(3), pages 439-49, August.
- Hamilton, Carl, 1986. "An Assessment of Voluntary Restraints on Hong Kong Exports to Europe and the USA," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 53(211), pages 339-50, August.
- Kala Krishna, 1985. "Tariffs vs. Quotas with Endogenous Quality," NBER Working Papers 1535, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kala Krishna & Kathleen Hogan & Phillip Swagel, 1989. "The Non-Optimality of Optimal Trade Policy: The U.S. Automobile Indust ry Revisited, 1979-1985," NBER Working Papers 3118, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kala Krishna, 1988. "The Case of the Vanishing Revenues: Auction Quotas With Oligopoly," NBER Working Papers 2723, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Irene Trela & John Whalley, 1988.
"Do Developing Countries Lose From the MFA?,"
NBER Working Papers
2618, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Trela, I. & Whalley, J., 1988. "Do Developing Countries Lose From The Mfa?," University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations Working Papers 8804c, University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations.
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