Do Socioeconomic Disparities Shape Norm Enforcement?[Les disparités socioéconomiques influencent-elles l’application des normes ?]

We investigate how socioeconomic disparities shape the enforcement of norms when observing third-party dishonesty. In an online Die-under-the-Cup (DUTC) experiment with a socioeconomically and geographically diverse sample of 720 participants from the French population, observers repeatedly evaluate reports from socioeconomically close and distant counterparts and can punish or reward them without affecting their own payoffs. We classify participants into three socioeconomic tiers using (i) a contextual measure based on average income in the locality of residence and (ii) a relative measure capturing individual income relative to the locality average. To summarise dishonest reporting patterns in this private-report environment, we introduce an observer-level proxy of suspicious reports. Results show that enforcement responds sharply to this proxy, as observers punish more and reward less as suspicion rises. Whether enforcement is socially selective depends on how distance is measured. Under the contextual measure, we find little evidence that close and distant counterparts are treated differently at comparable suspicion levels. Under the relative measure, selectivity emerges through responsiveness: punishment escalates more and rewards drop more strongly as suspicion increases when counterparts are socioeconomically distant. Finally, decomposing pairings by socioeconomic tiers reveals asymmetric enforcement along the hierarchy: holding suspicion constant, observers punish more and reward less when the counterpart is below them in socioeconomic status. In sum, the paper shows that how we measure socioeconomic distance is relevant for norm enforcement—highlighting a channel through which enforcement can reproduce inequality.