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Women's relative position and the division of household work: A study of French couples

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  • Catherine Sofer

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Sayyid Salman Rizavi

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of women's relative position in the labour market on the division of household work for French couples. Taking into account that household decisions are taken simultaneously, the paper provides empirical evidence that women's relative position in the labour market with reference to her partner influences the distribution of household work. We find that men's share of household work increases with his partner's better relative position in the labour market. But women's better position, relative to the average of her "type" has a less significant impact upon the distribution of household work within the household. Although the gap in household work decreases with the woman being in a better relative position, we never observe a role reversal: whatever their situation in the labour market may be, women always have in charge the largest share of household work.

Suggested Citation

  • Catherine Sofer & Sayyid Salman Rizavi, 2009. "Women's relative position and the division of household work: A study of French couples," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00687280, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00687280
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas Moreau & Elena Stancanelli, 2015. "Household Consumption at Retirement: A Regression Discontinuity Study on French Data," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00881215, HAL.
    2. Nicolas Moreau & Elena Stancanelli, 2015. "Household Consumption at Retirement : A Regression Discontinuity Study on French Data," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 117-118, pages 253-276.
    3. Nicolas Moreau & Elena Stancanelli, 2013. "Household Consumption at Retirement: A Regression Discontinuity Study on French," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13072, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    4. Harashima, Taiji, 2014. "Division of Work and Fragmented Information: An Explanation for the Diminishing Marginal Product of Labor," MPRA Paper 56301, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Comfort F. Ricketts & Randall C. Campbell & Jon P. Rezek, 2019. "The Effects of Work Hours on Physical and Mental Health of Late Prime Age Men and Women," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 64(2), pages 216-236, October.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure

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