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The Designated Hitter Rule in Baseball as a Natural Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Akihiko Kawaura

    (Department of Policy Studies, Doshisha University)

  • Sumner La Croix

    (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa)

Abstract

All but two professional baseball leagues have adopted the “designated hitter” (DH) rule, which allows a team’s manager to designate a player to bat at the plate and run the bases in place of another player, usually the team’s pitcher. Unlike the team’s other players, the designated hitter does not take the field to play defense. This paper provides a survey of a large literature investigating the DH rule’s effect on the incentives of pitchers to hit batters and on changes in the number of hit batsmen. We also consider whether the DH rule provides a good example of a natural experiment, as some professional baseball leagues were “treated” with the DH rule and others were not treated.

Suggested Citation

  • Akihiko Kawaura & Sumner La Croix, 2010. "The Designated Hitter Rule in Baseball as a Natural Experiment," Working Papers 201005, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hai:wpaper:201005
    as

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    File URL: http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_10-5.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2010
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    baseball; designated hitter; moral hazard; natural experiment; Japan;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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