Moral Hazard and the Effects of the Designated Hitter Rule Revisited
New evidence seems to cast doubt on the hypothesis that the American League's adoption of the designated hitter rule in 1973 created a moral hazard problem for pitchers. In particular, the substitution of hard-hitting designated hitters for weak-hitting pitchers in the American League supposedly explains the lion's share of interleague differences in hit batsmen. However, theoretical and empirical questions about the explanatory power of this alternative hypothesis leads the authors to the conclusion that moral hazard remains the most plausible reason why more American League than National League batters have been hit by pitches in twenty-two of the past twenty-five seasons. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 36 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK|
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:36:y:1998:i:4:p:688-92. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.