The Hazards of Moral Hazard: Comment on Goff, Shughart, and Tollison
Brian Goff, William Shughart, and Robert Tollison (1997) argue that the sharp increase in the number of hit batsmen after the adoption of the designated hitter rule is due to moral hazard. The author argues instead that simple changes in the composition of batters faced explains much of the observed effect. Pitchers are bad hitters and therefore are much less likely to be hit than their designated hitters. Furthermore, there is no correlation between the frequency with which individual pitchers hit opposing batsmen and their personal likelihood of being hit by a pitch while batting, contrary to the predictions of the moral hazard model. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 36 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK|
Fax: 01865 267 985
Web page: http://ei.oupjournals.org/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.oup.co.uk/journals|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:36:y:1998:i:4:p:685-87. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.