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The Hazards of Moral Hazard: Comment on Goff, Shughart, and Tollison

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  • Levitt, Steven D

Abstract

Brian Goff, William Shughart, and Robert Tollison (1997) argue that the sharp increase in the number of hit batsmen after the adoption of the designated hitter rule is due to moral hazard. The author argues instead that simple changes in the composition of batters faced explains much of the observed effect. Pitchers are bad hitters and therefore are much less likely to be hit than their designated hitters. Furthermore, there is no correlation between the frequency with which individual pitchers hit opposing batsmen and their personal likelihood of being hit by a pitch while batting, contrary to the predictions of the moral hazard model. Copyright 1998 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Levitt, Steven D, 1998. "The Hazards of Moral Hazard: Comment on Goff, Shughart, and Tollison," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 36(4), pages 685-687, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:36:y:1998:i:4:p:685-87
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    Cited by:

    1. Akihiko Kawaura & Sumner J. La Croix, 2007. "The Designated Hitter Rule and Team Defensive Strategy in Japan's Professional Baseball Leagues," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 8(5), pages 491-504, October.
    2. Akihiko Kawaura, 2010. "Designated Hitter Rule Debate: A Search for Mr. Hyde in Pitchers," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 11(3), pages 349-357, June.
    3. John Charles Bradbury & Douglas J. Drinen, 2007. "Crime And Punishment In Major League Baseball: The Case Of The Designated Hitter And Hit Batters," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(1), pages 131-144, January.
    4. Kevin Baldini & Mark T. Gillis & Matt E. Ryan, 2011. "Do Relief Pitching and Remaining Games Create Moral Hazard Problems in Major League Baseball?," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 12(6), pages 647-659, December.
    5. Gregory A. Trandel, 2004. "Hit by Pitches," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 5(1), pages 87-92, February.
    6. John Charles Bradbury & Douglas Drinen, 2006. "Research Notes: The Designated Hitter, Moral Hazard, and Hit Batters," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 7(3), pages 319-329, August.
    7. Akihiko Kawaura & Sumner La Croix, 2010. "The Designated Hitter Rule in Baseball as a Natural Experiment," Working Papers 201005, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.

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