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Should We Have or Should We Have Not, and Who Should Have Paid?

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Abstract

We analyze an overlapping generations model which explicitly includes a secondary asset market. The economy is affected by a onetime shock which causes some of these assets to become toxic. As a response the government may intervene by buying these assets at market value and removing them from trade. When the shock is not anticipated we find that government intervention cannot improve upon the laissez-faire equilibrium. However, when agents anticipate that a crisis may occur, removing the toxic assets dominates laissez-faire, particularly when the toxic asset holders are financing the intervention scheme. Finally, we show that curbing incentives which drive investors to find high yield opportunities decreases the severity of a crisis once it occurs, but also output.

Suggested Citation

  • Bental, Benjamin & Demougin, Dominique, "undated". "Should We Have or Should We Have Not, and Who Should Have Paid?," Working Papers WP2011/3, University of Haifa, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:haf:huedwp:wp201103
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    1. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So Different? An International Historical Comparison," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 56(3), pages 291-299, September.
    2. Bental, Benjamin & Eden, Benjamin, 1993. "Inventories in a Competitive Environment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(5), pages 863-886, October.
    3. Uhlig, Harald, 2010. "A model of a systemic bank run," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 78-96, January.
    4. Gorton, Gary & Metrick, Andrew, 2012. "Securitized banking and the run on repo," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(3), pages 425-451.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Crisis; Toxic Assets; Intervention;

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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