IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/gms/wpaper/1051.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Matching with Quotas

Author

Listed:
  • Mikhail Freer

    () (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University)

  • Mariia Titova

    () (Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego)

Abstract

The paper characterizes the core of many-to-one matching problem with quotas. The many-to-one matching problem with quotas may have an empty core, and there is no clear set of necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee non-emptiness of the core. Usual sufficient conditions for non-emptiness of the core for matching problems cannot be applied for the problem with quotas. We introduce set strong substitutability of preferences, a refinement of strong substitutability for the problem with quotas. We show that if preferences are set strongly substitutable, then the core of many-to-one matching problem with quotas is non-empty. Moreover, we prove that in this case the core has a lattice structure with opposition of interests. Length: 16

Suggested Citation

  • Mikhail Freer & Mariia Titova, 2015. "Matching with Quotas," Working Papers 1051, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, revised Jul 2016.
  • Handle: RePEc:gms:wpaper:1051
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.gmu.edu/schools/chss/economics/icesworkingpapers.gmu.edu/pdf/1051.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Kidney Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 119(2), pages 457-488.
    2. Chen, Yan & Sonmez, Tayfun, 2006. "School choice: an experimental study," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 202-231, March.
    3. Echenique, Federico & Oviedo, Jorge, 2006. "A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 233-273, June.
    4. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
    5. Sotomayor, Marilda, 1999. "Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 55-70, July.
    6. Elliott Peranson & Alvin E. Roth, 1999. "The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 748-780, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; Stability; Fixed Point; Quotas;

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gms:wpaper:1051. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shams Bahabib). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/icgmuus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.