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Is There Duration Dependence in Portuguese Local Governments’ Tenure?

Author

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  • Vítor Castro

    (Faculty of Economics University of Coimbra, GEMF and NIPE, Portugal)

  • Rodrigo Martins

    (Faculty of Economics University of Coimbra and GEMF, Portugal)

Abstract

This paper analyses the presence of duration dependence in Portuguese local governments’ tenure employing continuous and discrete-time duration analyses over a set of spells of time in office for the period 1979-2005. Our results show that the more time a party remains in office, the higher is the likelihood of leaving it. However, more flexible polynomial-in-time, cubic splines and time-dummies specifications show that the behaviour of that likelihood is not monotonic: it increases but only until the third term, then it decreases until the sixth term before starting to increase again. This study also shows that the likelihood of an incumbent party leaving office, given his tenure, is affected by the local economic environment, political support, the effective number of parties, the dimension of the municipality and the age of its leader. Additionally, it shows that that likelihood is consistently lower when the party leader/mayor decides to run for another term.

Suggested Citation

  • Vítor Castro & Rodrigo Martins, 2013. "Is There Duration Dependence in Portuguese Local Governments’ Tenure?," GEMF Working Papers 2013-04, GEMF, Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra.
    • Handle: RePEc:gmf:wpaper:2013-04.
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    15. Baleiras, Rui Nuno & da Silva Costa, Jose, 2004. "To be or not to be in office again: an empirical test of a local political business cycle rationale," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 655-671, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Vítor Castro & Rodrigo Martins, 2018. "Economic and political drivers of the duration of credit booms," NIPE Working Papers 15/2018, NIPE - Universidade do Minho.
    2. Susana Peralta & João Pereira dos Santos, 2020. "Who seeks reelection: local fiscal restraints and political selection," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(1), pages 105-134, July.
    3. Luca Agnello & Vitor Castro & Ricardo M. Sousa, 2020. "The Housing Cycle: What Role for Mortgage Market Development and Housing Finance?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 607-670, November.
    4. Sena Kimm GNANGNON, 2012. "Structural Vulnerability and Excessive Public Indebtedness in CFA Franc Zone Countries," Working Papers 201237, CERDI.
    5. Vítor Castro & Rodrigo Martins, 2020. "Riding the Wave of Credit: Are Longer Expansions Really a Bad Omen?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 729-751, September.
    6. Balaguer-Coll, Maria Teresa & Brun-Martos, María Isabel & Forte, Anabel & Tortosa-Ausina, Emili, 2015. "Local governments' re-election and its determinants: New evidence based on a Bayesian approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 94-108.
    7. Vítor Castro & Rodrigo Martins, 2021. "What drives the duration of credit booms?," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(1), pages 1531-1549, January.
    8. Sèna Kimm Gnangnon, 2012. "Structural Vulnerability and Excessive Public Indebtedness in CFA Franc Zone Countries," Working Papers halshs-00749470, HAL.
    9. Agnello, Luca & Castro, Vítor & Sousa, Ricardo M., 2021. "On the duration of sovereign ratings cycle phases," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 512-526.
    10. Gnangnon, Sèna Kimm, 2013. "Structural vulnerability and excessive public indebtedness in CFA Franc Zone countries," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 816-832.
    11. Fedeli, Silvia & Forte, Francesco & Leonida, Leone, 2014. "The law of survival of the political class: An analysis of the Italian parliament (1946–2013)," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 102-121.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Terms in Office; Portugal; Duration Dependence; Parties.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H79 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other
    • C41 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies

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